

МИНИСТЕРСТВО НАУКИ И ВЫСШЕГО ОБРАЗОВАНИЯ
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

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ИНСТИТУТ ОБЩЕСТВЕННЫХ НАУК И МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ

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ПРАКТИКУМ
по общественно-политическому переводу
с английского языка на русский:
ВНЕШНЯЯ ПОЛИТИКА РОССИИ
В РЕГИОНЕ БОЛЬШОГО СРЕДИЗЕМНОМОРЬЯ

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Р е ц е н з е н т ы:

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М82 Практикум по общественно-политическому переводу с английского языка на русский: внешняя политика России в регионе Большого Средиземноморья : учебное пособие / О.А. Москаленко, А.А. Ирхин ; Министерство науки и высшего образования Российской Федерации, Севастопольский государственный университет, Институт общественных наук и международных отношений. – Севастополь : СевГУ, 2020. – 76 с. – Текст : электронный.

Предназначено для совершенствования навыков анализа и перевода текстов общественно-политической направленности с английского языка на русский, посвященных реализации внешней политики Российской Федерации в регионе Большого Средиземноморья. В четырех разделах учебного пособия представлены авторские аналитические материалы, отражающие основные аспекты политических процессов в регионе, за которыми следуют аутентичные материалы для перевода на английском языке. Практикум может быть рекомендован как учебное пособие к практическим занятиям по дисциплинам «Общественно-политический перевод», «Публицистический перевод» для студентов специальности 45.05.01 Перевод и переводоведение, направления 45.03.02 Лингвистика, а также при подготовке магистров по укрупненной группе специальностей 41.00.00 Политические науки и регионоведение в рамках дисциплин, связанных с изучением английского языка для профессиональных целей.

Может использоваться как в качестве основного, так и в качестве дополнительного материала на среднем и заключительном этапе обучения переводу.

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ОГЛАВЛЕНИЕ

Вступительное слово.....	4
РАЗДЕЛ 1. THE GREATER MEDITERRANEAN REGION: DEEP INTO HISTORY.....	6
РАЗДЕЛ 2. RUSSIA IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THROUGH THE LENS OF THINK TANKS.....	17
РАЗДЕЛ 3. SYRIAN CONFLICT: REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DIMENSION.....	44
РАЗДЕЛ 4. RUSSIA IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: HOT NEWS.....	71
Список использованных источников.....	76

ВСТУПИТЕЛЬНОЕ СЛОВО

Предлагаемое учебное пособие носит междисциплинарный характер. Оно посвящено внешнеполитической стратегии Российской Федерации в регионе Большого Средиземноморья (Черноморско-Средиземноморском регионе). Данный регион, обозначаемый в англоязычных источниках именованиями *The Greater Mediterranean* или *The Black Sea and Mediterranean region*, воспринимается в мировой политике как единое Большое пространство, а отдельные его характеристики (важнейшее морское транзитное пространство, 25% мирового ВВП, 10% населения мира) позволяют назвать его одним из нескольких ключевых системообразующих глобальных пространств.

На современном этапе развития задача подготовки конкурентоспособного специалиста не сводится к формированию у него лишь узкоспециальных знаний, но предполагает обширную гуманитарную подготовку. Нельзя говорить о переводчике, не способном к анализу глобальных, региональных и страновых тенденций международного развития, равно как нельзя говорить о международнике, который не обладает навыком системной работы с англоязычными СМИ и аналитическими материалами. Только комплексная подготовка – залог успешного формирования кадрового потенциала, способного эффективно продвигать государственные интересы Российской Федерации в разных направлениях. После возвращения российского суверенитета над Крымом в 2014 году и восстановления роли Российской Федерации как субъекта в макрорегионе Большого Средиземноморья, особо остро стоит задача совершенствования механизмов влияния через «мягкую силу» в регионе.

В основу подготовки студентов-переводчиков и студентов-международников Института общественных наук им международных отношений Севастопольского государственного университета заложено обучение методам системного анализа исторических, политико-экономических проблем, проблем безопасности, конфликта и сотрудничества, а также тенденций развития международных отношений, изучение политических и экономических проблем важнейших

регионов мира, где Черноморско-Средиземноморский регион наряду с Дальним Востоком, Арктикой и европейским пространством является важнейшим геополитическим пространством формирования новой модели мирового порядка. Студенты ориентированы на глубокую языковую подготовку в рамках изучения двух иностранных языков (язык глобальной и региональной коммуникации). Специальные курсы по теории и прикладному анализу международных отношений, детальное изучение эволюции внешней политики России и других глобальных и региональных субъектов позволят выпускникам программы работать в сфере обеспечения национальной безопасности, в структурах, аффилированных с МИД РФ, международной журналистике, консалтинговых и аналитических структурах, органах государственной власти федерального и регионального уровня.

Данное учебное пособие предназначено для студентов старших курсов бакалавриата и специалитета, студентов-магистров, на высоком уровне владеющих английским языком и желающих усовершенствовать навыки переводческой деятельности, критического анализа текста и реферирования с английского языка на русский.

В качестве заданий на перевод представлены исключительно аутентичные тексты на английском языке. Каждый раздел сопровождается аналитическим обзором на русском языке, что позволяет переводчику перед работой над заданиями оценить имеющийся багаж фоновых знаний и восполнить пробелы, понять, выявить значение определенных терминов, снять часть переводческих трудностей и качественно выполнить предпереводческий анализ текста.

РАЗДЕЛ 1.

THE GREATER MEDITERRANEAN REGION: DEEP INTO HISTORY



Раздел позволяет переводчику взглянуть на разворачивание региона Большого Средиземноморья в большом (историческом) времени.

Термин Большое Средиземноморье (The Greater Mediterranean) обязан своим появлением французской исторической школе «Анналов» () и исследованиям французского историка и исторического географа Фернана Броделя, который провел всестороннее исследование макрорегиона Большого Средиземноморья. Кроме того, «является основоположником методологии историко-географического исследования, в основе которого лежит различие трех типов социального времени – эпизодического, конъюнктурного и «времени большой длительности» («большого» или «исторического времени»). Именно в большом времени разворачивается его историко-политическая география Большого Средиземноморья. На основе методологии «исторической длительности» Бродель выделяет этот макрорегион как целостность, несмотря на все климатические, цивилизационные и геополитические различия»¹

Фернан Бродель рассматривал регион как единое целое, воспринимая историю не только в политическом измерении, но и в экономическом, культурном и географическом, используя междисциплинарный подход, который лег в основу трехтомного труда «Средиземное море и средиземноморский мир в эпоху Филиппа II». В нем Бродель попытался охарактеризовать свое геостратегическое видение средиземноморского региона. Именно он первым из исследователей вышел за географические и цивилизационные рамки средиземноморского

¹ Нечаев Д.В., Чихарев И.А., Ирхин А.А., Маковская Д.В. Концепция геостратегического атласа Большого Средиземноморья // Вестник Московского университета. Серия 5. География. 2019. № 1. С.67-74

бассейна. Стержневым тезисом в исследовании послужило убеждение в том, что историческое Средиземноморье является примером целостного образования, для которого характерно экономическое единство. Бродель применил комплексный подход к изучению всего региона, и предпринял попытку написать обобщающий или «глобальный» труд по истории Средиземноморского региона в большом хронологическом охвате².

Задание 1.1. В 1975 году в газете The New York Times была опубликована очень объемная, подробная рецензия на изданный в английском переводе труд Фернана Броделя. Ниже приведены ее отдельные фрагменты.

Прочитайте текст. Охарактеризуйте его с точки зрения жанрово-стилевого своеобразия. Насколько современным вам кажется этот текст? Не устарел ли он. Попробуйте определить, что составит основные трудности при переводе.

Выполните письменный перевод.

The Mediterranean

By Richard Mowery Andrews

May 18, 1975

1. With the publication in English of the second volume of Fernand Braudel's prodigiously innovative study of Mediterranean civilizations in the 16th century, Americans can now read in its entirety what is probably the most significant historical work to appear since World War II. First published in France in 1949 and revised in 1966, "The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II" has generated international admiration and debate.

² Ирхин А.А., Москаленко О.А. Черноморско-Средиземноморский регион в современной западной аналитике // Гуманитарные чтения «Севастопольская гавань»: материалы научно-практической конференции. 2019. С.319-324.

2. The first volume begins with a vast description of the natural environment and material foundations of Mediterranean life from the Middle Ages to the early 17th century, and then proceeds to a reconstruction of 16th century economics and demography. The second volume moves from civilizations and social structures to 16th century Mediterranean politics, diplomacy and warfare, as Braudel analyzes the two great empires of the age—Catholic Spain and Moslem Turkey—and the more traditional societies on which they converged. In one of the many dimensions of his originality, Braudel revises all customary notions of early modern history by demonstrating that the confrontation between Latin Christendom and Ottoman Islam, which culminated in the battle of Lepanto in 1571, was the decisive political and cultural reality of the era, the one conditioning all others—including the more peripheral conflict of Reformation and Counter-Reformation. But “The Mediterranean” is far more than a study of early modern history.

3. Fernand Braudel's “The Mediterranean” is both the crowning achievement of postwar French historiography and the fullest revelation of its intentions. Massive and intricate, “The Mediterranean” is a conceptually difficult work: its arguments unfold in huge overlapping tiers, in a geological progression through various layers of collective experience and across different scales of time.

4. The “Greater Mediterranean” of the 16th century was a vast region of economic interdependence, with the coastal plains and cities as its magnetic center. Early in the century, the Turkish and Spanish empires, propelled by evangelical religions and expanding populations, emerged from Anatolia and Iberia to converge on the wealth and sophistication of the “Inner Mediterranean “

5. Volume II traces the rise and declining of these great empires. Braudel analyzes the structures, methods, phases and consequences of Hapsburg and Ottoman expansion within the Mediterranean basin: the decline of Renaissance city-states and of urban autonomy in the Islamic zone; the growth of bureaucracies and standing armies; the drift of urban oligarchies into aristocratic indolence; the proliferation of nobilities;

the gradual bankruptcy of imperial states; the emergence of a rapacious and ultimately sovereign international financial community.

6. In a scenario resembling that of the mid-20th century's planetary economy, Braudel reveals that the influx of gold and silver in the famous “price revolution” of the 16th century stimulated only the privileged summits of the Mediterranean economy, and largely through the ultimately ruinous mediation of credit. The price revolution impoverished masses already suffering from ever-population within archaic social structures and opened a greater chasm between rich and poor than had perhaps ever before existed in the West—a chasm that was soon filled by hunger, disease, vagabondage, prostitution, banditry, riot and the respondent brutality of the wealthy classes. Blocked and decaying at their source—in agriculture and its social organization—the Mediterranean economies were poised on the brink of the great depression of the 17th century.

7. “In both the long and short term,” writes Braudel, “agricultural life was all-important. Could it support the burden of increasing population and the luxury of an urban civilization so dazzling that it has blinded us to other things?” Braudel's answer is no. Demography, studied in relation to economic trends and social structures provides the analytic thread connecting the two volumes of “The Mediterranean” and is one of Braudel's great methodological triumphs.

8. Mediterranean societies of the 16th century were eclectic and porous, despite their selfprotective religious dogmatism. Adversaries needed each other and the “red thread of war” (including ubiquitous piracy) provided a vital symbiotic link, a medium of constant exchange of techniques, commodities and populations. Frontiers were less barriers than permeable membranes for a massive, continual flow of groups and individuals. Euld) Ali, the Neapolitan convert to Islam who became Commander - in - Chief (“Kapudan Pasha”) of the Turkish fleet at Lepanto; Alonso de Contreras, Spanish soldier of fortune; Joseph Micas, Portuguese Jew and financier to Istanbul who was created Duke of Naxos: these were simply the more dramatic personifications of a sociological phenomenon uncovered by Braudel. In the 16th-century Mediterranean,

individuals were defined less by race, nationality or religion than by immediate role and circumstance: On the Maghrebian coasts, in the eyes of both Spaniards and Arabs, there were “Jews of peace,” familiar inhabitants of the cities, and “Jews of war,” strange merchants who emerged with caravans from the feared Sahara and Sahel, just as for Venice there were always “Moslems of peace,” tradesmen of the Balkans, and “Moslems of war,” predators of the Adriatic.

9. When the European geopolitical axis shifted from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic and the North this general texture of life began to disappear from Western experience. Territorial empires gave way to nations; the membranes solidified into ever more implacable frontiers; the mercantile capitalism of the 16th century was supplanted by an increasingly abstract and dehumanized industrial capitalism; national and racial identities became murderously literal.

10. The civilization of the modern West is not one of the explicit themes of “The Mediterranean.” Yet Braudel does subtly convey a valuation, in the passionate quality of his evocations and through a tone of elegiac nostalgia often similar to that of Thomas Mann's marvelous and poignant “Voyage With Don Quixote.”

11. Fernand Braudel's method gives us a structure for the exercise of our own historical imaginations. His work describes the last of the several major periods when the world of the Inner Mediterranean magnetized alien civilizations and submitted to their force while profoundly altering them.

12. We are experiencing today another convergence on the Mediterranean by great territorial states, animated by both imperial and defensive wills. Once again, the seismic forces of economics and demography are operating within archaic, decaying social structures and propelling anxious elites to confrontation in the Mediterranean, as they did within the bloated empires of the 16th century. Oil, not agricultural and luxury products, is now the magnetic commodity. Yet the geography of convergence (centered on the Near East and North Africa) resembles that of the 16th century. Today, just as then, confrontation—through the bellicosity of intermediaries and at their expense — joins the great states in a macabre dialogue concerning technology and economic force. The Latin Baroque and the Ottoman Holy War have contemporary incarnations;

although the principal ideologies and their shibboleths are now secular, not religious, they still function to mystify and discipline recalcitrant or potentially volatile masses, who are still herded by élites.

13. Will the policies of governments produce their intended consequences any more than did those of the 16th-century imperial rulers? Do modern states enjoy a freedom of decision any greater than that of Philip II, Sulaiman the Magnificent, Pius V, the Beys of Algiers or the Venetian Council of State? We are literate, and thus ostensibly enlightened, but is the structural meaning of today's convergence on the Mediterranean any more readily accessible to us, or its outcome more subject to our wills, than was that of the 16th century for its contemporaries?

14. “The Mediterranean” provokes us to raise these vital questions, precisely because its entire design constitutes a radical departure from conventional approaches to the historical study of politics. To understand this design, we must examine the genesis of the work and Fernand Braudel's largest moral and intellectual purpose.

15. Fernand Braudel's vision of history is unmistakably postimperial, shaped by analysis of the failure of French imperial ambitions and of the intellectual dogmas which had provided their underpinning. In “The Mediterranean” this vision is expressed not merely by the theme of the failures of political wills (Spanish and Turkish) central to Volume II, but also in the articulation of the entire work, from the geographical analysis at the beginning to the almost metaphysical sweep of the conclusion. Braudel conveys this post-imperial vision by three fundamental strategies.

16. “The Mediterranean” is one of the great contemporary adventures of humanist imagination. By gathering the previously dispersed natural and social sciences to recover for history the relations between man and nature, by disclosing new and genuinely organic scales of time, by restructuring our perception of the past and thus of society itself, Fernand Braudel and his colleagues are accomplishing a revolution in historical thought, the only one commensurate with our century and its global necessities.

Задание 1.2. Вам предстоит работать над переводом материала Роберта Каплана, написанного для издания The Atlantic в сентябре 2016 года.

Прежде чем приступать к чтению статьи, познакомьтесь с краткой информацией о ее авторе. Слышали ли вы о нем раньше?

Robert D. Kaplan is the bestselling author of nineteen books on foreign affairs and travel translated into many languages, including *The Good American*, *The Return of Marco Polo's World*, *In Europe's Shadow*, *Asia's Cauldron*, *The Revenge of Geography*, *Monsoon*, *The Coming Anarchy*, and *Balkan Ghosts*.

He is a managing director at Eurasia Group, the world's premier **political risk consultancy**. For three decades he **reported on foreign affairs** for *The Atlantic*. He held the national security chair at the United States Naval Academy and was a member of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board and the U.S. Navy's Executive Panel. *Foreign Policy* magazine twice named him one of the world's "Top 100 Global Thinkers."³

From 2008 to 2012, Kaplan was a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, DC; he rejoined the organization in 2015. Between 2012 and 2014, he was **chief geopolitical analyst** at Stratfor, a **private global forecasting firm**. In 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates appointed Kaplan to the Defense Policy Board, a federal advisory committee to the United States Department of Defense.⁴

Kaplan presents conflicts in the contemporary world as the struggle between primitivism and civilizations. Another frequent theme in Kaplan's work is **the reemergence of cultural and historical tensions** temporarily suspended during the Cold War.

Обратите внимание на выделенные жирным шрифтом словосочетания. Переведите их с учетом контекста. Проверьте, насколько предложенные варианты соответствуют нормам русского словоупотребления. Встречаются ли в современном русскоязычном общественно-политическом дискурсе?

³ Robert D. Kaplan. Official website URL: <https://www.robertdkaplan.com/>

⁴ Wikipedia

Задание 1.3. Прочитайте статью Роберта Каплана «How Islam Created Europe». Увидели ли вы в ней отражение научной концепции автора, упомянутой в задании 1.2?

Охарактеризуйте издание The Atlantic. Какова его целевая аудитория? А какова целевая аудитория статьи? Дайте жанрово-стилевую характеристику текста.

Понадобятся ли вам для работы справочные источники и если да, то какие?

В тексте есть цитаты классиков. Какого решения на перевод они требуют?

Прежде чем приступать к переводу текста, проанализируйте значение и историю появления в современном тексте единиц Mare Nostrum и Middle Sea.

Выполните письменный перевод текста.

How Islam Created Europe

In late antiquity, the religion split the Mediterranean world in two. Now it is remaking the Continent.

ROBERT D. KAPLAN

MAY 2016 ISSUE

Europe was essentially defined by Islam. And Islam is redefining it now. For centuries in early and middle antiquity, Europe meant the world surrounding the Mediterranean, or Mare Nostrum (“Our Sea”), as the Romans famously called it. It included North Africa. Indeed, early in the fifth century a.d., when Saint Augustine lived in what is today Algeria, North Africa was as much a center of Christianity as Italy or Greece. But the swift advance of Islam across North Africa in the seventh and eighth centuries virtually extinguished Christianity there, thus severing the Mediterranean region into two civilizational halves, with the “Middle Sea” a hard border between them rather than a unifying force. Since then, as the Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset observed, “all European history has been a great emigration toward the North.”

After the breakup of the Roman empire, that northward migration saw the Germanic peoples (the Goths, Vandals, Franks, and Lombards) forge the rudiments of Western civilization, with the classical legacy of Greece and Rome to be rediscovered only much later. It would take many more centuries for the modern European state system to develop. Slowly, though, feudalism, whose consensual give-and-take worked in the direction of individualism and away from absolutism, gave way to early modern empires and, over time, to nationalism and democracy.

Along the way, new freedoms allowed the Enlightenment to take hold. In sum, “the West” emerged in northern Europe (albeit in a very slow and tortuous manner) mainly after Islam had divided the Mediterranean world.

Islam did much more than geographically define Europe, however. Denys Hay, a British historian, explained in a brilliant though obscure book published in 1957, *Europe: The Emergence of an Idea*, that European unity began with the concept (exemplified by the Song of Roland) of a Christendom in “inevitable opposition” to Islam—a concept that culminated in the Crusades. The scholar Edward Said took this point further, writing in his book *Orientalism* in 1978 that Islam had defined Europe culturally, by showing Europe what it was against. Europe’s very identity, in other words, was built in significant measure on a sense of superiority to the Muslim Arab world on its periphery. Imperialism proved the ultimate expression of this evolution: Early modern Europe, starting with Napoleon, conquered the Middle East, then dispatched scholars and diplomats to study Islamic civilization, classifying it as something beautiful, fascinating, and—most crucial—inferior.

In the postcolonial era, Europe’s sense of cultural preeminence was buttressed by the new police states of North Africa and the Levant. With these dictatorships holding their peoples prisoner inside secure borders—borders artificially drawn by European colonial agents—Europeans could lecture Arabs about human rights without worrying about the possibility of messy democratic experiments that could lead to significant migration. Precisely because the Arabs lacked human rights, the Europeans felt at once superior to and secure from them.

Islam is now helping to undo what it once helped to create. A classical geography is organically reasserting itself, as the forces of terrorism and human migration reunite the Mediterranean Basin, including North Africa and the Levant, with Europe. The Continent has absorbed other groups before, of course. In fact, Europe has been dramatically affected by demographic eruptions from the east: In the medieval centuries, vast numbers of Slavs and Magyars migrated into central and eastern Europe from deeper inside Eurasia. But those peoples adopted Christianity and later formed polities, from Poland in the north to Bulgaria in the south, that were able to fit, however bloodily, inside the evolving European state system. As for the Algerian guest workers who emigrated to France and the Turkish and Kurdish guest workers who emigrated to Germany during the Cold War, they represented a more containable forerunner to the current migration.

Today, hundreds of thousands of Muslims who have no desire to be Christian are filtering into economically stagnant European states, threatening to undermine the fragile social peace. Though Europe's elites have for decades used idealistic rhetoric to deny the forces of religion and ethnicity, those were the very forces that provided European states with their own internal cohesion.

Meanwhile, the new migration, driven by war and state collapse, is erasing the distinction between the imperial centers and their former colonies. Orientalism, through which one culture appropriated and dominated another, is slowly evaporating in a world of cosmopolitan interactions and comparative studies, as Said intuited it might. Europe has responded by artificially reconstructing national cultural identities on the extreme right and left, to counter the threat from the civilization it once dominated.

Although the idea of an end to history—with all its ethnic and territorial disputes—turns out to have been a fantasy, this realization is no excuse for a retreat into nationalism. The cultural purity that Europe craves in the face of the Muslim refugee influx is simply impossible in a world of increasing human interactions.

“The West,” if it does have a meaning beyond geography, manifests a spirit of ever more inclusive liberalism. Just as in the 19th century there was no going back to feudalism, there is no going back now to nationalism, not without courting disaster. As

the great Russian intellectual Alexander Herzen observed, “History does not turn back ... All reinstatements, all restorations have always been masquerades.”

The question is thus posed: What, in a civilizational sense, will replace Rome? For while empire, as Said documented, certainly had its evils, its very ability to govern vast multiethnic spaces around the Mediterranean provided a solution of sorts that no longer exists.

Europe must now find some other way to dynamically incorporate the world of Islam without diluting its devotion to the rule-of-law-based system that arose in Europe’s north, a system in which individual rights and agency are uppermost in a hierarchy of needs. If it cannot evolve in the direction of universal values, there will be only the dementia of ideologies and coarse nationalisms to fill the void. This would signal the end of “the West” in Europe.

РАЗДЕЛ 2.

RUSSIA IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THROUGH THE LENS OF THINK TANKS



Отдельным и особо значимым является вопрос места и роли России, Русской цивилизации, Русского мира в Средиземноморье. В силу исторических причин роль Крыма и Севастополя, Причерноморья и Средиземноморья в развитии российской государственности и ответное влияние России на макрорегион в последние три десятилетия практически не рассматривались. Следствием явились грубые искажения истории со стороны новейших интерпретаторов. Традиционными лидерами в изучении Черноморско-Средиземноморского региона являются американские и европейские институты и мозговые центры, фабрики мысли, которые объединены собирательным названием *think tanks*. В историографии вопроса следует также выделить региональных лидеров – итальянскую школу геополитики Рисорджименто и французскую школу Анналов, речь о которой шла в Разделе 1.

Распад Советского Союза и биполярной системы международных отношений открывает новый этап развития региона, который отражается в концептуальных разработках как Евро-Средиземноморское пространство, Большой Ближний Восток, Большой Черноморский регион, Евро-атлантическое Причерноморье. Объединяющим эти концепции является констатация факта ослабления России и мотивация дальнейшего вытеснения Западом ее позиций из региона Большого Средиземноморья на Восток с последующей утратой возможностей в Черном море.

В конце 1990 и в 2000-х гг. проблемы Черноморского региона заняли одну из ключевых позиций в исследованиях американских мозговых центров: Гарвардского университета (Harvard University), Совета по международным отношениям (Council on Foreign Relations), Университета национальной обороны

(National Defense University), Брукингского института (The Brookings Institution), Центра стратегических и международных исследований (Center for Strategic and International Studies), Германского Фонда Маршалла (The German Marshall Fund of the United States), Института анализа и международной политики (Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis), Фонда «Наследие» (The Heritage Foundation) и др.

Германский Фонд Маршалла (Р. Асмус) и Фонд «Наследие» (А. Коэн) в 2004 и 2006 гг. соответственно, представляют концептуальные документы в отношении Стратегии США в Большом Черноморском регионе, где предполагается и обосновывается дальнейшее вытеснение России на север Евразии.

На уровне реальной политики после разрушения Советского Союза и вплоть до второй половины 1990-х гг. США в своей внешней политике переживали период «неопределенности», однако уже в 1997 году Вашингтоном был сделан выбор в пользу реализации модели «однополярного мира». С этого времени начинает разрабатываться и апробироваться новый внешнеполитический подход по реформатированию Евразии: концепции «Больших пространств», «Большой Ближний Восток», «Большая Центральная Азия», «Большой Черноморский регион».

В 2004 г. по инициативе Германского Фонда Маршалла рабочей группой из 49 человек (представителей научно-исследовательских центров США, ЕС и всех стран Черноморского региона) был разработан документ «Развитие новой Евро-Атлантической стратегии в отношении Черноморского региона». Он явился одной из первых попыток концептуального оформления тех практических шагов, которые США предпринимают в регионе с начала 1990-х гг., с перспективой упрочения позиций на данном пространстве. Эта же цель отражена в ещё одном варианте внешнеполитической стратегии США в Черноморском регионе, разработанной в 2006 г. сотрудниками Фонда «Наследие», в документе «Стратегия США в Черноморском регионе».

Среди расположенных непосредственно в пределах региона аналитических центров и институтов имеет смысл выделить наиболее крупные.

1. Европейский институт Средиземноморья IEMed, основанный в 1989 году и ставящий своей целью установление взаимопонимания, взаимообмена и сотрудничества между странами Средиземноморского региона, общностями и культурами. Институт публикует массивный ежегодный отчет по вопросам реализации заявленной миссии и финансируется за счет средств Еврокомиссии (<https://www.iemed.org>).

2. Комиссия по изучению Евросредиземноморского региона EuroMeSCo: была основана в 1996 году и в настоящий момент объединяет 106 институтов из 32 стран Евросредиземноморья. С 2014 года EuroMeSCo занимает 8-е место в первой десятке мировых «фабрик мысли». В 2015 году получила четырехлетний грант на проведение исследований региона (<https://www.euromesco.net>).

3. В 2016 году по инициативе IEMed и EuroMeSCo на основе лучших 30 мировых «фабрик мысли» была создана интегрированная аналитическая сеть “Med Think 5+5”, миссия которой – развитие региональной интеграции и сотрудничества в западной части Средиземноморья с учетом основных рисков, с которыми регион сталкивается в настоящее время или может столкнуться в перспективе в связи с изменением геополитической обстановки (<https://medthink5plus5.org>).

4. Институт экономического прогнозирования в Средиземноморье (Mediterranean World Economic Foresight Institute (L’Institut de Prospective Economique du Monde Méditerranéen - IPAMED)), основанный в 2006 году, ставит целью интеграцию в средиземноморское пространство стран северной и южной частей региона посредством экономических мер. При этом неправительственная организация финансируется за счет частных средств и всячески подчеркивает в своей миссии общее будущее стран региона на фоне усиливающихся глобальных тенденций регионализации и того, что США, Китай и Япония разрабатывают стратегии по заключению экономических и политических союзов с потенциальными региональными партнерами (ALENA, ASEAN, +3) (<http://www.ipemed.coop/en/ipemed-r21>) [9].

5. НКО Mediterranean Affairs занимается вопросами изучения политических процессов в Средиземноморском регионе, при этом подчеркивая, что после окончания Холодной войны, относительного периода стабильности в 2000-х, с 2011-х годов глобальные акторы вновь вывели Средиземноморье в центр мировой политической арены. При этом исследователи признают Россию в качестве актора, оказавшего первоочередное влияние на возвращение Средиземноморского региона в эпицентр мировых политических процессов, и обосновывают ее интересы необходимостью выхода в Средиземное море и сохранения влияния на южно-славянские общности. США воспринимают регион как один из ключевых для установления и разыгрывания новых балансов сил; для Великобритании и Индии он представляет интерес прежде всего с т.з. коммуникаций, а для Азии – является частью Великого шелкового пути (<http://mediterraneanaffairs.com/our-mission/>).

Стоит отметить, что деятельность перечисленных европейских институтов и аналитических центров носит достаточно неравномерный характер, переживая очевидный спад в период с конца 2000-х и до середины 2010-х.

При отсутствии явного единообразия в именовании региона, он, тем не менее, воспринимается как целостный научным сообществом. По данным исследовательской группы Scimago, рассчитывающей индикатор влияния научных журналов на основе их цитирования в наукометрической базе Scopus, на 2017 год более 100 журналов и научных изданий различного профиля занимаются исключительно исследованиями тех или иных аспектов истории и развития Средиземноморско-Черноморского региона: от естественнонаучных до общественно-политических. При этом преобладающее большинство издается при финансовой поддержке США и Великобритании.⁵

⁵ Ирхин А.А., Москаленко О.А. Черноморско-Средиземноморский регион в современной западной аналитике // Гуманитарные чтения «Севастопольская гавань»: материалы научно-практической конференции. 2019. С.319-324.

Задание 2.1. Переведите введение к отчету одной из фабрик мысли о перспективах России в регионе Большого Средиземноморья. Выполните перевод текста. Обратите особое внимание на высокий уровень компрессии.

In the last decade Russia has searched for new alternative policies to compensate for its political deficiencies and to balance its rivals in one of the key areas of the approaching geopolitical rivalry, the sea. The Russian assertiveness seen in the Black Sea-Mediterranean basin has recently been a real concern for the international community. In the six chapters of this report, contributors explain Moscow's newly perceived assertive foreign and security behavior in the Black Sea and Mediterranean basin from their own perspectives, and reach a conclusion about the limits and validity of this new Russian ascendance in the region.

Задание 2.2. Внимательно прочитайте текст.

Предложите несколько вариантов перевода заголовка.

Перед тем, как приступать к переводу, 1) составьте глоссарий имен собственных; 2) проработайте понятия *hybrid warfare, competitors, potential challenge, balance of power, areas of geopolitical interest* (уточните их значение, подберите устоявшиеся варианты передачи на языке перевода).

Выполните письменный перевод текста.

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THE RUSSIAN WEB IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION

Andrea Beccaro, Anna Sophie Maass

Nowadays, the Mediterranean region's balance of power is challenged by several conflicts and actors. Russia has taken advantage of this complex and fluid situation, becoming a key actor, expanding its military involvement, and building up political relationships. A key step in this process has been Russian involvement in the Syrian conflict since September 2015. While this was a surprising development, the paper

argues that it is nonetheless consistent with Russia's regional interests and its renewed foreign policy.

Introduction

Although Russia has suffered setbacks in Syria, its political influence is growing due to several factors. To begin with, the end of the siege of Aleppo represented a key military step in the frame of Syrian conflict and an indubitable political victory of the Russian diplomacy. Secondly, the new political and military alliance with Turkey is demonstrated by the recent Russian-Turkish joint airstrikes to support Turkish operation in the al-Bab area. Finally, the peace talks in Astana organized by Russia at the end of January represented both a way to strengthen the trilateral alliance between Russia, Turkey, and Iran and a potentially concrete step toward the conclusion of Syrian conflict. However, it would be a mistake to assume that Russian influence is restricted to Syria, in view of the fact that its military and political links extend throughout the Mediterranean. Consequently, this article first takes into account the Russian military involvement in Syria in the light of the hybrid warfare concept, before focusing in Egypt and Libya. The second part sheds light on Russia's possibility to undermine the EU's role in Syria. In recent years, the EU and Russia have become competitors over parts of the EU's Eastern neighbourhood, a fact which has been epitomised by the eruption of the Ukraine conflict. Through demonstrating certain facets of Russia's influence in parts of the EU's Southern neighbourhood, this article elucidates Russia's role in the region as a potential challenge to the EU's geopolitical objectives.

Russian military involvement in the Mediterranean

After the war in Ukraine, Russian warfare has been frequently termed "hybrid warfare", denoting a sort of "new" combination of conventional and unconventional types of warfare, along with propaganda and political subversion. In light of Russian involvement in the Mediterranean, two considerations regarding the notion of "hybrid warfare" should be kept in mind. First, 'war is not — and has actually never been — a "pure" military matter'; consequently, there is nothing new in the "hybrid" notion. Secondly, Russian "hybrid warfare" is more a label used by Western scholars than a true Russian doctrine. Therefore, in the case of Russian operations in Syria and, to a

certain extent, in the Mediterranean region, the notion of “hybrid warfare” is questionable and misleading due to the fact that Russia appears to follow a more conventional and traditional path.

First of all, in recent years Russia has pursued a very efficient A2/AD (anti-air/area denial) strategy along its west borders and in areas of its geopolitical interest, such as the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East, due to the deployment of the S-400 air defense system to Syria in November 2015 and to Crimea in August 2016. This advanced air defense system prevents Russia’s opponents from establishing air supremacy, and it could also threaten naval operations offshore in Syria, due to the deployment of the naval version of the S-300 and the coastal defense system in Tartus. Russia has continued to build its network of anti-air missile systems, and deployed an additional seven advanced S-300 units along the Syrian coast in November 2016. Moreover, such a defensive system indicates that Russia plans a long-term presence in Syria. In fact, Putin has already signed an order to transform the Tartus Russian naval facility into a permanent base. Even after the recall of Admiral Kuznetsov to the port of Severomorsk, highly-capable vessels remain in the area, such as Pyotr Velikiy and Admiral Grigorovich. These naval assets strengthen Russia’s attack arsenal, and represent the Russian largest naval operation since the Cold War.

Furthermore, Russia has used almost its entire modern and conventional arsenal in Syria. “During the operation in Syria, 162 advanced and upgraded weapons have been tested in combat. They have proven to be highly efficient,” Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu commented. Russia has used a variety of modern aircrafts armed with precision-guided munitions, the new attack helicopter, the KA-52K, and cruise missiles launched both from the Mediterranean Sea and from the Caspian Sea.

Although the Russian advanced A2/AD system shows that Russia is following a conventional rather than a hybrid path in Syria, to a certain extent, Russian strategy has demonstrated a more asymmetrical approach. In fact, in Syria, Russia has employed its Special Forces in order to shore up the Syrian Army. This path is rather similar to U.S. operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya or even Kosovo, where Special Forces or elite military units were deployed both to direct precision air bombings and to train and

support local allies. In Syria Hezbollah represents the local Russian ally and it has been a useful non-state partner to Russian forces. Moreover, Moscow views Hezbollah a capable ally that has strongly contributed to the survival of the Syrian government.

The Syrian war has highlighted shortcomings in Russia's military capabilities; however, the intervention has to be framed in light of Russian strategy. To begin with, the Syrian conflict could represent an opportunity for Russia to test its weaponry capabilities; secondly, the Syrian war represents just one of the steps that Russia is taking in the Mediterranean region. In fact, Russia has been able not only to maintain its control over key naval bases, such as Sevastopol in the Black Sea, but it has also been able to expand its influence in Syria, Egypt, and Libya. Although the Russia presence in these last two countries is considerably more limited than in Syria, they represent a section of an intricate political, military, and economic web which Russia is constructing in the Mediterranean area.

On the one hand, Russia is tightening its relationship with Egypt, which has allegedly sent army officers to Syria to train alongside Russian advisors. Although Egypt has dismissed this news, Major General Ali Mamlouk, the head of Syria's National Security, paid an official visit to Cairo in October 2016, and more recently it has been said that Egyptian troops could be sent to Syria to observe the implementation of the truce between the Syrian regime and the armed opposition. Previously, from 15 to 26 October 2016, Russia and Egypt undertook a training exercise in the desert area of Alam El-Khadem. The maneuvers involved 500 parachute soldiers in an exercise to liberate buildings from terrorists. This renovated political relationship between Russia and Egypt could represent an important diplomatic victory for Putin, and it constitutes a key element for Russian involvement in Libya, where it strongly supports General Khalifa Haftar, a close and loyal ally of Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.

Moreover, Russia is attempting to reinvigorate its economic, political, and military relationships with Libya, following the deterioration which occurred after the end of Gaddafi regime. Libya was an important customer in heavy industry and military equipment from Soviet Russia and, as a consequence, thousands of Soviet engineers and military instructors worked there, and some even participated in the Gaddafi conflicts.

Simultaneously, Libyan officers attended specialized courses in the USSR, one of whom, General Khalifa Haftar, commander of Libya's eastern army, is today a key, if controversial, figure in Libya. Haftar visited Moscow twice in 2016, and, in January 2017, visited the Admiral Kuznetsov, positioned off the Libyan coast. Haftar requested a more integrated role for Moscow in Libya and, above all, weapons and military equipment. Russia would be willing to accept such requests in case of the lifting of the UN embargo, and, in the meantime, Russia is using its local allies, Egypt and the UAE, to support Haftar. Russia's goal in Libya is twofold. First, Russia wants to re-activate the economic deals worth about \$10 billion that were signed with Gaddafi and included weapons sales and the construction of a rail link between Sirte and Benghazi. Secondly, Russia could ask Haftar for the possibility to use the military base at Benghazi, as proposed by Gaddafi when Russia was in search of Mediterranean naval bases. Nowadays, Russia does not need such an installation because it can use Tartus; however, Benghazi could represent both a useful second naval facility and a further element of Russian power in the Mediterranean.

Russia's political investment in the Mediterranean

Russia's increasing military and political role in the Mediterranean encourages international observers to speculate about the Kremlin's motivations for nurturing its influence in the region. Mark Galeotti, from the European Council on Foreign Relations, argues that Russia's motivations to engage with Syria, for instance, was "at least in part [due] to counter attempts to isolate it diplomatically and to force the West to engage with it". He argues that, since September 2015, the Kremlin has not invested in its disengagement from the Syrian conflict because, according to some Russian officials, this would have implied losing "leverage in the region and with the West"

The latest version of the Russian Foreign Policy Concept, published on December 1 2016, is an example of Syria's geopolitical importance in Russian foreign affairs. One of the objectives of the Foreign Policy Concept is to "consolidate the Russian Federation's position as a centre of influence in today's world". In this way, it reflects one of the main narratives of this document's previous versions. With regard to Russia's relations with Syria, the Concept states that "Russia supports the unity, independence

and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic as a secular, democratic and pluralistic State with all ethnic and religious groups living in peace and security and enjoying equal rights and opportunities”. Libya and Egypt play a comparatively more moderate role in Russian foreign affairs; they are not mentioned in the Concept.

The trilateral alliance built first in December 2016 between the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, and his Turkish and Iranian counterparts, and then cemented during the Astana conference is a reminder of Russia’s role in the shaping of Syria’s geopolitical future. The Astana peace conference was anticipated by two consecutive meetings. A meeting in Moscow on 28 October gave the three ministers the opportunity to exchange their points of view regarding the future of Syria at the height of continued shelling in Aleppo. On 20 December, the Russian, Iranian and Turkish foreign ministers reconvened in Moscow in an attempt to prepare the peace deal of Astana which could serve as the foundation for the settlement between Syrian rebels and the regime of the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. A meeting in this format is unprecedented. Despite the consecutive meetings between Lavrov and the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, a representative from the US was not present during the meeting.

No less surprising is the absence of a representative from the EU, despite its concern for Syria, which was stated in the Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy. According to the Strategy, “the EU will act at different levels of governance: conflicts such as those in Syria and Libya have local, national, regional and global dimensions which must be addressed. Finally, none of these conflicts can be solved by us alone. Sustainable peace can only be achieved through comprehensive agreements rooted in broad, deep and durable regional and international partnerships, which the EU will foster”.

Despite the Global Strategy’s ambition to contribute to the resolution of the Syrian crisis by cooperating with other actors, in the latest attempt to resolve the crisis, the EU was sidelined.

Another preparatory step to Astana and a further example which demonstrates Syria’s key role in Russia’s foreign policy is the Russian-Turkish plan agreed on 29 December 2016 to establish a cease-fire in Syria. This plan, which was approved by the

UN Security Council, represented the first time that Turkey and Russia have spearheaded such a joint initiative, and has thus laid the “foundation of a new format of conflict resolution, dominated by Russia and Turkey”. However, the plan’s intention to avoid direct confrontation among the belligerent parties whilst enhancing the political dialogue between regional players “in order to marginalise the role of the West (mainly the US) in the Syrian conflict” proved unsustainable; the fighting resumed. The reasons for the limitations of this peace deal affect also the Astana deal and are arguably two-fold. Firstly, the ceasefire excluded Islamic State (IS) and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and “overlooked the issue of Kurdish forces”. Secondly, according to Krzysztof Strachota from the Centre for Eastern Studies in Warsaw, “the truce not taking effect has been probably factored in from the very beginning in the Russian-Turkish Agreement. Its importance stems rather from the political calculations of both parties which regard the joint ceasefire plan as a way of asserting their political domination in Syria”. Strachota argued that Russia’s intention was to control the Syrian government, whilst Turkey is interested in “controlling” the opposition to President Assad, IS, and the Syrian Kurds.

The EU’s exclusion from this attempted peace agreement regarding Syria raises questions about the EU’s role as a contributor to both peace-and state-building in Syria. The increasing dominance of other political actors, such as Russia, Turkey, and Iran, challenge the EU’s intentions regarding the Syrian war as they were mentioned in the EU’s Global Strategy. Simultaneously, the EU’s seemingly vanishing influence in Syria raises doubts about the sufficiency of some of the policy tools which the EU has at its disposal within the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), a policy framework shaping the EU’s relations with its sixteen neighbouring states in the East and in the South.

Conclusion

In recent years, Russia’s political and military involvement in the Mediterranean has increased considerably. At its Western borders, in the Eastern Mediterranean, and in the Black Sea region, Russia has applied an A2/AD strategy, both indicating Russia’s strategic investment in its medium- to-long-term involvement in the Syrian conflict and preventing its opponent from establishing air superiority. In addition, the Kremlin’s

increasing engagement with Libya and Egypt demonstrates Russia's extending web of influence in the Mediterranean, a phenomenon even more starkly exemplified by its increasing role in Syria. The question remains as to whether these military deployments are backed up by a sustainable political strategy developed by Russia for its role in the Syria conflict.

Less than a month after the deal of Astana regarding the peace resolution for the Syrian crisis was struck between Russia, Turkey and Iran, it is premature to allude to the potential outcomes of this agreement and to attempt to predict Russia's role in the medium- to long-term. The resolution of the Syrian crisis depends on multiple factors. First and foremost, it depends on the willingness of rebels to maintain the cease-fire. Second, a sustained resolution of the Syrian war is also conditional upon the sustenance of a cordial dialogue between Russia, Turkey, and Iran, with mutually acceptable objectives regarding Syria. In case these aforementioned conditions are fulfilled, one needs to acknowledge that the policy initiatives that the EU can deploy in Syria within the ENP have been sidelined.

Multiple actors competing with one another are likely to play crucial roles in the Mediterranean. As a consequence, a balance of power among these actors, on the one hand, and their divergent interests, on the other, are at this stage impossible to discern. However, it should be noted that the balance of power in the Mediterranean region is radically changing as a result of several conflicts, of different geopolitical interests, and of new actors. In this new landscape Russia is undoubtedly playing a key role in terms of diplomacy, since Astana has not only strengthened the trilateral alliance with Turkey and Iran, but it has also enhanced the Russian regional influence as a result of the trilateral alliance, the strong and presumably permanent Russian presence in Syria, and its increasing relationship with other countries in the Mediterranean, such as Libya and Egypt. However the role of Russia is also military since Russia is enhancing its military asset in Syria, where it has found in Hezbollah a well-trained military ally, and is intent on supporting Haftar in Libya.

Задание 2.3. Прочитайте текст доклада. Дополните глоссарий имен собственных из Задания 2.2. Выполните аннотированный перевод на русский язык объемом 7-8 тысяч знаков.

RUSSIA IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: STRATEGIES AND ASPIRATIONS

The following report is based on points raised during a *Mediterranean Advisory Group* meeting on “Russia in the Mediterranean” held by the KAS Regional Program South Mediterranean in September 2017 in Tunis. The report includes additional analytical commentary by the authors.

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Introduction

Moscow’s sway in the Mediterranean region is growing and many actors increasingly consider Putin a key regional player. In the context of ambivalent positions of Western states towards the region, to many, Putin represents state sovereignty and stability, a non-Islamist agenda, and strong decisive leadership; and in a region plagued by conflict and instability perceptions often trump reality. Furthermore, many MENA countries are looking to diversify their economies and political relationships. Russia provides an important diversification opportunity to them, beyond simply signaling to the West that they have other options.

As the West still debates whether Putin has a strategy for the region, it has yet to come up with its own strategic response to counter Russia’s influence in the region. Meanwhile, Moscow’s goals in the region appear to span beyond Syria, with Moscow’s growing alliance with Iran and its expanding influence in North Africa. The paper at hand aims to shed light on Russia’s growing presence in the Mediterranean region and the shifts this presence has caused in the geopolitical balance of power.

Russia’s posture: Syria and Iran

Moscow and Damascus: historic ties and continuing support

Moscow and Damascus have a history of close ties that goes back at least seventy years. The Soviet Union supported Syria’s request for independence in the spring and summer of 1945 during the UN Security Council debates. Once Syria gained

independence Moscow established relations with Damascus. Syria has been Moscow's most important foothold in the region and closest ally in the Arab world to whom it provided military aid. When Hafez al-Assad took Syria's presidency in November 1970 through a military coup, the two countries continued to cooperate and signed a number of important bilateral treaties, such as the 1972 peace and security pact and the November 8, 1980, USSR Friendship and Cooperation treaty. At least forty thousand Syrians studied in elite Soviet schools and many returned to Syria to occupy chief government posts. Half of those who set the general direction of the Syrian Ba'ath party spoke Russian.

When Putin assumed Russia's presidency in May 2000 he worked to regain positions Russia lost in the Middle East during the 1990s in a zero sum anti-Western approach to foreign policy to reduce Western influence. Syria's geostrategic position, especially at a time when Moscow lost its historical standing in the Black Sea, was especially important to Putin, in addition to the pre-existent close ties. From a geostrategic view point, Syria provides an entry into the region and access to the Mediterranean. Putin protected Bashar al-Assad from the very beginning diplomatically, politically, and economically. But the September 2015 intervention which occurred in the context of years of Western ambivalence and projected weakness was a game changer because it officially put Russia back on the Middle East map.

The Kremlin has several reasons for protecting Assad. First, Putin's priority is regime survival. He genuinely believes the West sponsors regime change against authoritarian leaders, be it in the peaceful color revolutions in the post-Soviet space, the Middle East, or protests against Putin himself. Indeed, Putin and other senior Russia officials have often said so directly. Putin, for instance, accused then-US State Secretary Hillary Clinton of giving the "signal" for anti-Putin protestors to come out in Russia in late 2011 and early 2012. In this context Moscow perceived the NATO Libya campaign as just another Western-imposed regime change by other means. Second, historically Russia's foreign policy gets more aggressive abroad when things worsen at home, and the Kremlin seeks to distract the domestic audience.² Syria provided a great domestic distraction at a time when Russian economy was doing poorly, and the emotional wave

of patriotic feelings the Kremlin had induced with its earlier Crimea annexation was also going down. Third, as a landlocked country Russia always sought warm water ports, and Tartus was Russia's only naval facility outside the former Soviet Union. Fourth, Russia had billions of investments in Syria which included energy deals that it seeks to protect.

Putin officially went into Syria to fight ISIS and thus prevent radicalized fighters from returning to Russia.

Moscow however targeted virtually everyone but ISIS. These actions suggested that Moscow aimed to put the West in front of a choice: it is either ISIS or Assad. While the weaponry Russia brought to Syria was irrelevant to fighting ISIS, it served to project Russia's power in the region and to limit the ability of Western actors to maneuver militarily, as the next section outlines in more detail.

Moscow's intervention also revealed a pro-Shia tilt in the region, while its expanded military presence in Syria, according to some experts, presents an alternative to the US bases in Spain and the Incirlik base in Turkey with implications for the military balance in the region. It also suggests that Moscow's game plan for the region is not limited to Syria. Indeed, as the North Africa section shows, Moscow has many interests in the MENA. Meanwhile, no matter what Moscow says about its military operations in Syria, Russia's military presence in Syria is now assured for at least the next 49 years, as Moscow signed an agreement to keep the Tartus naval base and Khmeimim air base there for this time period.

Moscow's military operations in Syria

Broadly speaking, from a military expert perspective, Syria is now an arena for defense competition with the

West which Russia seems to be currently winning because of its non-linear understanding of the Syrian conflict. Moscow used Syria as a testing ground and advertisement for new weapons and the tactic is paying off. Russian arms exports received a substantial boost. Half of Russian arms sales abroad is combat aircraft, and this number is expected to grow. Russia overall is the world's second largest arms

exporter after the US, but in emerging markets (excluding the pro-Western Gulf) it has certain advantages.

Russia's military affairs have undergone major changes especially after Moscow's 2008 Georgia invasion which revealed weaknesses in the Russian armed forces. Moscow has been boosting its capabilities ever since and while it did not succeed everywhere it can point to many serious improvements. Overall the Kremlin shows flexibility and learning from experience. This adds to reasons why the West should be careful to underestimate the Kremlin's military capabilities.

Amon other developments, Moscow is currently attempting to create anti-access/area denial (A2AD) bubbles, from Crimea to Syria through the deployment of S-400s and other operations in order to limit the West's ability to maneuver. Without Crimea these operations would not be possible, which suggests Moscow perhaps had more of a long-term plan than many in the West had realized.

A complete A2AD bubble would mean that the West cannot operate at all. While this is not the case, Moscow still succeeded partially. The West now must take Moscow into account when thinking through military actions in a way it did not have to before. For instance, some military experts believe the reason why the US used targeted cruise missile strikes against Assad's facilities in April 2017, following Assad's largest use of chemical weapons since 2013, is because the risk of using manned aircraft was too high given the Russian air presence; the US wanted to shield its pilots from unnecessary risk. Meanwhile, the cost of Russia's overall military operations, while ultimately cloaked in secrecy, appear relatively cheap.

Additionally, Moscow used Syria to provide combat experience for Russian pilots, with impressive results. Russian submarine activity on the Mediterranean is the highest since the Cold War. The hard to detect submarines are an important part of Moscow's A2AD efforts and power projection capabilities.

From an operational perspective, one major failure for Moscow was the deployment of Russia's only aircraft carrier admiral *Kuznetsov* since the carrier had major accidents. This should have come as no surprise: at the time of deployment, the *Kuznetsov* was old, leaky, and prone to fires. Some described it as a bigger danger to its

passengers than anyone else, or a floating coffin. It is thus hardly a match for at least ten American operational carriers. Yet the deployment matters a great deal symbolically and militarily since even a single ship can potentially create an important military advantage and an aircraft carrier is a symbol of military support for a country's interests. Simply by being there when the US was absent, Moscow was able to project power. To be sure, the Russian navy still has major problems and lags far behind the country's aviation capabilities, but in Syria it provides a clear example of how the Kremlin played a weak hand well, while the West had a strong hand but played it poorly.

Russia and Iran: A lasting alliance?

Another important issue is the relationship between Russia and Iran in Syria. From an Iranian perspective, Tehran has a strategic alliance in Syria with Moscow. This is a turning point in modern Russia-Iran history. Indeed, the improvement in relations between these historical rivals is unprecedented. Russia no longer opposes Iran joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and invited it to join the Eurasian Union or at least have a free trade zone with it. Whether any of this will happen remains to be seen, but the fact of the matter is, Moscow has not offered any Arab nation cooperation on such deep level, beyond a free trade zone. That these conversations took place alone is significant, even if they do not bear fruit.

For Iranian experts, the main question now is: what is next in the bilateral relationship in post-ISIS Syria? Some of these experts worry that Moscow will break with Iran if allowed to be an equal partner with the US in Syria. Some Iranians did not approve of the latest de-escalation zones agreement, which excluded Iran. Others worry about Russia's friendly relations with Israel. At the end of the day, will Moscow listen to Tehran's concerns?

Another key question for the alliance is Assad's future. Both Moscow and Tehran insist that Assad should continue to lead Syria, yet Moscow is willing to be more flexible. For Tehran, Assad's removal is a red line, because Tehran has invested heavily in the Assad family and has no plan B. Meanwhile, Russia has massive influence in the entire B'ath party beyond Assad. If Assad is to be replaced by someone close to

Moscow but not Tehran, this risks undermining Iran's influence drastically. While these differences are real, it is difficult to imagine who other than Assad Moscow is currently prepared to back. Technically Tehran indeed has always been more wedded to Assad than Moscow, but this is also somewhat misleading. By constantly repeating that Moscow is not wedded to Assad himself, the Kremlin creates a perception of greater flexibility as compared to Iran, and signals it can be willing to negotiate with the West on this issue. Yet in practice, Moscow has yet to back anyone but Assad. This is another example of how Moscow gains advantages by displaying flexibility.

Experts tend to believe the Russia-Iran alliance will not break anytime soon, though at least some believe it will not develop further either. Some Iranian experts believe that Russia has many friends in Syria, but its only real ally in Iran; and Moscow knows this. Moscow, these experts say, knows the difference between friends and allies. Moscow is also aware of the deep distrust in Iran towards Russia, but tries not to let it affect the alliance.

The Kremlin also knows that a heavy presence in Syria is costly and wants an ally – Iran – to preserve this presence. Tehran for its part has grown more pragmatic in recent years and does not want to put Russia in a position of having to choose between Tehran and someone else. Both sides are aiming at finding pragmatic solutions in the current situation by postponing discussions about differences to a later point of time during which they depend less on the other than right now. While an unforeseen event in Syria may rupture the relationship, it is more likely that in the long run the relationship will continue despite the differences.

It is too early to tell if it might be possible for the West to exploit divisions in this relationship. Some experts report of rumors that there is a division in the Syrian armed forces high command between pro-Russian and pro-Iranian generals. In the long run it is possible that a division might emerge between high-tech oriented and ground forces. The Syrian high tech elites such as the Syrian air force are more pro-Russian. The forces currently clearing Damascus fight side by side with Shia militias and could be more inclined to be proIranian. But this remains to be seen.

Syria's future

Looking ahead, several obstacles hinder reconciliation and reconstruction in Syria. The issue of the high numbers of refugees forced to leave their homes in Syria presents one of the central obstacles. While there is variation between different Western countries on the issue of refugees from Syria, by and large, the West is turning a blind eye to the depopulation in Syria, driven by Assad and Tehran, and with Putin's support. As long as Assad remains in power, the vast majority of refugees will not return to Syria, and if they do, they will not return to their original homes. With Assad in power Syria will not undergo genuine reconciliation, and thus will not attain genuine stability. This situation is perhaps the most significant obstacle to a true peaceful resolution to the Syrian conflict.

Experts also do not foresee genuine reconstruction in Syria. The security situation remains difficult, and development requires institutions which do not exist. In Europe at least, there is a sense that the winners should undertake reconstruction, and in Syria that is not the West. Yet Moscow, one clear winner who arguably should contribute to these efforts has neither the interest nor the ability to pay for reconstruction beyond ensuring its own narrow interests in limited areas. Indeed, according to one recent Valdai conference, Russian officials sent a strong message that they believe the West should pay for this. Regardless, the general mood in Europe and the US is that it will not be paying for reconstruction.

One possible outcome in Syria then is a frozen conflict similar to what Moscow has created in the post-Soviet space: it will ensure a degree of stability, but tensions will continue to simmer underneath and occasionally erupt. When it suits Moscow's interests, the Kremlin might also encourage these tensions. Such a scenario would ensure the need for Moscow's presence, but without incurring heavy costs. Tied to this uncertain future for Syria is the stability of the entire region, especially regarding Iran's growing regional influence.

North Africa: New Theatre for Russian Presence

Beyond Syria, the five North African countries on the southern Mediterranean create the perfect arena for the Kremlin's ambitions to expand and develop its

economic, military and political power. Moscow is reinforcing its position in North Africa by consolidating and strengthening its traditional alliance with Algeria, and developing stronger relationships with Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia.

Libya: Russia's ambitions

Libya is increasingly a key target for Moscow's growing ambitions to influence the Middle East and North Africa, but it is unclear if the Kremlin has a strategic plan on how to handle the Libyan case. The conventional wisdom is that the Kremlin supports Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA) in Eastern Libya, against Islamist groups and the Western-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). However, experts disagree on the extent to which Moscow leans towards Haftar. Certainly the Kremlin is reaching out to other Libyan stakeholders. Putin is keeping his options open for Libya by widening Moscow's contact base in Libya to also include Haftar's opponents.

In June 2016, GNA deputy Ahmed Mitig visited Moscow and met with Russian officials to discuss cooperation opportunities and support for the Libyan Political Agreement as well as the UN-backed GNA. In March 2017, the head of the UN-backed GNA Faiez Serraj visited Moscow with the same agenda. Then in April 2017, Moscow received a delegation from the powerful city of Misrata to get the perspective of Haftar's opposition on the ground. Meanwhile Moscow has limited engagement with Haftar on counter-terrorism issues which involves technical assistance and limited hardware support that is being channeled through Egypt.

That said, Moscow did airlift in February 2017 approximately seventy of Haftar's wounded fighters and flew them to Moscow for treatment, something it had not done for any other actor in the country. Regardless of the true extent for Moscow's support for Haftar, these actions show that the Kremlin is comfortable operating in Libya militarily.

Moscow's strategy in Libya is likely to revolve around some key issues including economic interests, where Russia lost billions of dollars in contracts signed with the Qaddafi regime in the energy, construction, infrastructure and weapons markets. The regime in Moscow will be looking to safeguard those economic interests going forward.

On February 20, Russia's energy giant Rosneft signed a deal with Libya's state oil company for investments in Libya's energy sector. The move serves as an indication that Moscow could use Rosneft as one of its foreign policy tools in a geopolitically shaped southern Mediterranean region. After Moscow's military success in Syria, Putin might be interested in bolstering his diplomatic credentials and facilitating his role as a peace-maker in Libya as well as fixer of the West's perceived mistakes and failures. Needless to say that this presents an opportunity for constructive engagement with Russia. Russian officials expect to be involved in international discussions on Libya.

Moscow also has military and geopolitical interests in Libya and the Kremlin would like to have a naval base on the country's eastern coast. In 2008, Moscow discussed the possibility of setting up a naval base in Benghazi with the Qaddafi regime to counter-balance U.S. interests in Africa. In 2009, a Russian military official told media outlets that Russia had decided to establish naval bases in Libya, Syria and Yemen within a few years; a clear indication of Russia's interest and ambitions in projecting its power in the Middle East and North Africa region. However, given the current security situation and the ongoing struggle for power between various stakeholders in Libya, the idea of setting up a naval base in Libya right now is less attractive than it was in 2008.

Nevertheless, Libya presents a valuable geopolitical bargaining chip for Russia against the West in general and Europe in particular. In its standoff with the West, Moscow could opt for confrontation in Libya, and could use the insecurity inside the country and mass migration from Libya as leverage against Europe. Russia's game in this regard could be to just keep the country in the current unstable state in order to ensure a continuous flow of high numbers of migrants into Europe.

Egypt: Russia's efforts for stronger relations

Egypt was a key ally for the Soviet Union until the late 1970s, when Cairo defected to the Western camp and became an important ally for the United States in the Middle East and received billions of dollars in military and development aid from Washington. However, following the 2013 coup led by General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi that overthrew Muslim Brotherhood president Mohamed Morsi and the subsequent

crackdown on dissent accompanied by shrinking space for human rights, freedom of expression and political participation post 2013, the West and in particular the Obama Administration started to distance itself from Cairo.

On his part, el-Sisi turned to Putin and Russia to fill the void. In 2015, Putin visited Cairo and received a jubilant welcome from his host. El-Sisi visited Moscow four times from 2013 to 2015. During these visits, he signed various treaties including arms and energy deals. Additionally, various trade and cooperation agreements were signed including the establishment of a free trade zone between Egypt and the Eurasian Customs Union (EACU), which is in its final stages.

In 2014, Russia and Egypt signed a USD 3.5 billion arms deal to supply Egypt with Russian arms and ammunition, as well as air defense systems and aviation, including 46 Ka-52 “Alligator” Attack Helicopters. In June 2017, the Russian defense and foreign ministers discussed the extension of their 10-year Strategic

Partnership Agreement signed between Russia and Egypt in 2009 with their Egyptian counterparts. In addition, Moscow is discussing building a nuclear power plant for Egypt.

Moreover, Moscow is focused on the development of mutual trade and agricultural business with Cairo. Figures show that the trade exchange between Egypt and Russia exceeded USD 3.2 billion from January to August 2017, including Russian exports to Egypt recording USD 2.8 billion and USD 407 millions of Egyptian exports to Moscow. Russian investment in Egypt amounted to USD 3.1 billion by the end of 2016, 52 percent of which were in the oil and gas sector.

However, Russia’s and Egypt’s economies are both stagnating, and there might be limits to what their economic cooperation can achieve. But military cooperation holds far more promise. Additionally, the Cairo regime under el-Sisi is aligning itself with Moscow on key regional issues. In October 2016, Egypt voted with Russia against a UN Security Council resolution that sought to end air strikes in Syria – a clear hint that Cairo was ready to go to great lengths to win favors with Moscow even if that came at the expense of its relationship with key Arab allies such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia

which oppose the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. A few weeks after the UN Security Council vote, the two nations held their first-ever joint military drill.

Furthermore, Moscow and Cairo are cooperating closely on Libya. In October 2016, reports surfaced that Russia deployed a special forces unit to an Egyptian military base near the Libyan border. The purpose of this deployment was to increase Russia's cooperation with Haftar's LNA forces on counter-terrorism issues. This puts Russia in direct competition on the ground against Western countries such as France and the United Kingdom. Since 2015, both countries had special non-combat missions present in eastern Libya to coordinate counter-terrorism efforts with Haftar's LNA. A senior western military source confirmed that Russia currently has dozens of Special Forces personnel based in Benghazi to support the LNA with intelligence and technical expertise.

Tunisia and Morocco: New opportunities

Morocco and Tunisia present new opportunities for Russia's economic and trade cooperation goals in the region. In addition to security and counter-terrorism cooperation, Russian officials are focused on the promotion of Tunisia and Morocco as new tourism destinations for Russian holidaymakers as well as technological and industrial business opportunities.

For example, Tunisia saw 30 percent tourism growth in 2017, with Russia as the top source of tourists with over 600,000 Russian tourists arriving in the first half of 2017. This is excellent news for Tunisia's struggling tourism sector that has been hit hard by two major attacks in 2015. The terrorist attacks that targeted the Bardo National Museum and a tourist beach in Sousse led several European tour companies and cruise operators to suspend operations. In March and April 2016, Moscow hosted several meetings with high-level representatives from Tunisia including Foreign Minister Khemaies Jhinaoui, who previously served as the ambassador to Moscow from 2008 to 2011, and the Russian-Tunisian intergovernmental commission on cooperation in trade, economy, science and technology. In 2017, Russia was present in all of the events held at the international conference *Tunisia 2020*, supporting the economy and investment.

Additionally, in January 2016, Russia announced that it would lower tariffs on Tunisian exports by 25 percent - potentially reducing Tunisia's trade deficit with Russia. During the same month, Tunisia's Ministry of Transport announced that Tunisair would begin flying three weekly direct flights to Moscow as of May 2016. This is aiming to develop the Tunisian exports towards Russia, which currently stand at about USD 36 million comprising mostly agricultural products and food industry goods opposed to USD 1.7 billion worth of imports.

Russia and Tunisia furthermore signed a nuclear energy cooperation agreement in September 2016. The deal would see Russia support Tunisia in the creation and improvement of its nuclear infrastructure in accordance with international recommendations, in the engineering and construction process of nuclear reactors for energy and research purposes, in the development of uranium deposits as well as exploration of Tunisia's mineral resources base to develop its nuclear sector.

Morocco, a key Western ally in North Africa, is another focus of Russia's new shift in attention to the Southern Mediterranean region. In October 2017, Russian Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, headed a delegation of high level officials and businessmen to Rabat. Since King Mohammed VI's visit to Moscow in March 2016, the two countries have expressed interest in boosting bilateral cooperation. Morocco is seeking to become Russia's major Arab and African economic partner. The trade exchanges between the two countries moved from USD 200 -500 million a year (depending on sources) in 2001 to USD 2.5 billion in 2015. In 2013, Rabat and Moscow signed an important maritime fishing agreement. Russia ranked in 2016 as Morocco's ninth supplier and 22nd client with 27 percentage increase in trade between the two countries in the same year.

In 2016, King Mohamed VI visited Moscow and signed a "deep strategic partnership declaration". During the King's visit agreements on energy and counter-terrorism were signed as well. At the same time, Morocco is aiming at a fivefold rise in Russian tourism over the coming years. Naturally, Morocco's foreign policy and diplomacy is driven by a variety of issues to address and the issue of the Western

Sahara takes prominence. Russia could thus be a promising choice regarding potential support for Morocco's stance on the issue.

In April 2017, in an interesting move, Moscow welcomed a delegation from the Polisario Front, the independence movement of the Sahrawi people of Western Sahara. Observers of Russia's "charm offensive" in North Africa noted that Russia's increasing interest and involvement in the Western Sahara conflict has been more evident since Morocco and Nigeria signed a pipeline deal, which was announced in December 2016. One goal of that project is to provide Europe with an alternative to Russian gas, which Europe currently depends on heavily.

Algeria: strengthening a traditional alliance

Algeria has long been Russia's traditional partner and buyer of Russian weapons. This makes it a key growth market for Russia's economic, security and diplomatic efforts in the southern Mediterranean region. In 2014, the two sides signed an estimated USD 1 billion deal in which Algeria would use kits from Moscow's state arms supplier to build 200 tanks – an agreement that has been described as possibly the largest export contract for main battle tanks in the world.

Currently Russia's engagement with Algeria is focused on the two key areas of security and military cooperation as well as closer cooperation in the energy sector: In 2016, Algeria began receiving an order of 14 Sukhoi SU-30 fighter jets. In 2017, Russia will have delivered two Tigr-class corvette ships armed with Russian cruise missiles to Algeria, and in 2018, Moscow will deliver two Black Hole submarines to Algiers. Moscow's arms sales to Algeria picked up after Russia decided to write off Algeria's debt to Russia in 2006. In 2015 and 2016, the trade value between Russia and Algeria stood at USD 2 billion.

Despite Europe's nervousness about the possibility of an Algerian-Russian deal to manipulate gas prices globally, such cooperation between both countries never materialized. This indicates that when it comes to energy, Algeria-Russia relations remain sensitive, since both view each other as energy competitors. That said, the West should not dismiss the energy factor entirely. Russian Gazprom managed to enter the Algerian oil and gas market in October 2014 when drilling at the El Assel oil and gas

bloc, jointly developed by Gazprom and Sonatrach. The two companies also plan to cooperate on future projects.

Conclusion

As Moscow continues its advance across the Middle East and North Africa, the US and different European countries disagree on what approach to take towards Russia and the region. For the US under President Obama, the Iran deal with the backchannel through Oman became the administration's foreign policy lynchpin at the cost of other regional issues. President Trump now appears to be taking a limited and transactional approach to the region – though in Syria his approach differs little from Obama's. Trump's approach towards Russia also remains ambiguous. It is unclear if the current US retreat will be an exception or the norm in the future of American foreign policy in the coming years.

For Europe, a major challenge is to define the EU's regional interests. Simply put, different European countries have different interests. In order to craft a single approach to the region, Europe needs a single clear vision and strategic patience. Change takes a long time, enormous resources, and good will. Meanwhile, European borders are messy. As one European expert put it, the question European policymakers pose themselves is not what we want to see in the next decades, but what do we want to protect ourselves from? The answer is uncontrolled illegal migration. Europe's main strategic goal thus is defensive.

Despite far-reaching differences of opinion between European countries, they show a certain level of agreement in the area of defense and security. When it comes to Russia, there is a level of agreement between European countries on the matter that did not exist prior to Moscow's Crimea annexation in March 2014, based on a shared lack of confidence in Russia. Nonetheless, Europe has yet to formulate a single coherent approach towards the country.

Beyond Europe, the West as a whole has yet to come up with a clear and effective way of reacting to the growing Russian presence in the Mediterranean and the MENA

region as a whole. Europe for its part has to be a player, not just a payer. To get there, it has to develop real strategic tools and goals that take into account the Russian strategy of seeking to preserve the status quo and maintain order – as Moscow defines it. The West more broadly has to find a way to deal with the semblance of stability this Russian approach creates in the region. Moscow has neither the desire nor the ability to help conflicting parties to peacefully resolve grievances. Quite to the contrary, Moscow is more likely to fan the flames of low-level conflict because it would justify Russia's presence in the region under the cloak of an indispensable partner, while simultaneously undermining the West. At the same time, Russia's own future remains uncertain. But until Western policymakers develop a better understanding of Moscow's true goals and consistently pursue a clear vision towards Putin's Russia, the Kremlin will find ways exploit weaknesses and divisions in the strategies of Western powers to bolster its influence – in the Middle East, and beyond.

РАЗДЕЛ 3.

SYRIAN CONFLICT: REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DIMENSION



Четыре системные переменные: мировой экономический кризис, рост новых центров силы, убывающая мощь США и усиление роли транснациональных компаний – взаимно влияют друг на друга, определяя модель будущего мирового порядка.

Несмотря на технологические достижения в области НТР и перенесение акцента в процессе конкуренции государств в область «мягкой силы» и финансовых технологий, борьба за геополитическое пространство остается основной сферой соперничества великих держав, а в современном мире две противоположные тенденции – глобализация и регионализация (логика сфер влияния) – жестко конкурируют между собой, формируя значительный потенциал конфликта. Гражданская война в Сирии показала, что мир в отдельных регионах или даже странах остается отражением биполярной системы периода «холодной войны». При этом баланс мировых сил изменился не в пользу Запада, который с конца 1970-х сумел создать американо-китайский альянс против СССР. После данного виртуозного стратегического хода Вашингтона петля военно-политического, экономического, технологического удушения советского пространства замкнулось. В настоящее время Китай играет самостоятельную игру, а внешнеполитические линии обороны Пекина и Москвы во многом совпадают. В то же время Запад, опьяненный победой в «холодной войне», стал более разобщенным. Политическое руководство США на протяжении последних 20 лет проводило односторонние силовые акции, перестраивая мир под новую американскую модель глобального доминирования. Эти действия способствовали расколу Запада как минимум на два ядра: Западную Европу и США.

Каковы же причины и движущие силы сирийского конфликта? Попробуем смоделировать динамику данного конфликта и его роль в мировой политике в условиях глобального экономического кризиса. Традиционным полем

конкуренции различных великих держав является Ближний и Средний Восток. Причины банальны: современная человеческая цивилизация – это цивилизация нефти. Но в этом регионе она еще и качественная и дешевая (низкое содержание серы и низкая себестоимость ее добычи, даже по сравнению с Латинской Америкой, не говоря уже о России). При этом рынок США зависит от поставок из этого региона на 5-7%, тогда как европейская зависимость значительно выше. Однако и до открытия нефти, как важнейшего вида сырья современной экономики, данный регион сохранял свое значение в мировой политике: эпоха крестовых походов и столкновение Запада и Востока в период средневековья, строительство важнейшей водной коммуникации – Суэцкого канала, от стабильности функционирования которой зависело существование Британской империи, занимающей четверть мировой суши – вот некоторые факторы.

В современном мире Ближний и Средний Восток как источник углеводородных ресурсов и Восточное Средиземноморье как путь их транспортировки, имеют стратегическое значение для наиболее развитых экономик мира. Этот факт ставит в зависимость экономические системы западных государств и Китая от стабильности в указанных регионах. В то же время районы насыщены различными видами вооружения, в них присутствуют опасные международные очаги напряженности: турецко-сирийские, ирано-иракские, греко-турецкие противоречия, войны в Ираке, Афганистане, палестино-израильский конфликт. Несмотря на то, что в регионах отсутствует стабильность, последним и решающим арбитром в них является американская военная мощь. США распространили свое влияние на этот регион после Второй мировой войны. До середины 1940-х гг. Ближний и Средний Восток был зоной исключительного влияния Британии. Для управления регионом Вашингтон начал использовать те же технологии, что и Лондон, выстраивая на основе парадигмы **«balance of power»** систему балансов из конкурирующих государств, игра на которых дает максимальные дивиденды их субъекту. В традиции западной цивилизации для продвижения своих национальных интересов используются два вида баланса сил: французский (*raison de tat* – национальный интерес) и английский **«balance of**

power». Французский предполагает непосредственное участие субъекта в одном из разыгрываемых балансов, тогда как английский баланс сил предполагает дистанционное разыгрывание субъектом различных комбинаций без непосредственного участия, и только, когда ситуация становится критической, то субъект всей своей мощью вступает в игру на стороне, которая позволяет ему разрешить свои национальные интересы в полной мере. Для США в регионе Ближнего и Среднего Востока существуют три противоборствующие пары: арабы и израильтяне, индийцы и пакистанцы, иракцы и иранцы – и до 2003 года США на Ближнем и Среднем Востоке руководствовались английским принципом «баланса сил». После указанного рубежа США начали проводить прямые интервенции в Ираке и Афганистане, перейдя к французской методологии, и тем самым уничтожили или существенно подорвали выстроенные ранее балансы: Ирак – Иран, Пакистан (Афганистан и Пакистан воспринимается Вашингтоном, как единый регион АфПак) – Индия. По мнению Генри Киссинджера, весь американский механизм влияния в регионе сводится к следующим трем интересам: поддержание регионального баланса сил, обеспечение бесперебойных поставок нефти и разгром исламистских групп, которые угрожают Америке. Всякий ход Соединенных Штатов, преследующий любую из указанных целей, должен предприниматься при учете двух других, что существенно усложняет достижение каждой из них. Из нерегиональных субъектов, влияющих на ситуацию на Ближнем и Среднем Востоке, особенно необходимо выделить интересы и геополитические возможности Китая и России. Если остаточное влияние последней получило второе дыхание в связи с сирийским кризисом, то экспансия Пекина носила экономический характер и к 2011 г., к моменту «Арабской весны», приобрела угрожающие масштабы для Запада. Китай нуждается в углеводородных ресурсах для своей «мировой мастерской», а военные кампании США, даже без видимой победы, – это ограничения для Пекина получать эти ресурсы. Внутрорегиональный расклад сил выглядит таким образом: на Ближнем и Среднем Востоке существует два претендента на роль региональных держав (ВВП, технологический потенциал, ВПК, наличие

различных природных ресурсов, мобилизационные возможности, способность предложить цивилизационные модели развития) – Иран и Турция. Обе – непримиримые в прошлом империи, представляющие два различных проекта внутри Ислама: шиитский и суннитский. До 1979 г. оба государства входили в американскую систему интересов, составляя прочный треугольник: Тель-Авив – Тегеран – Анкара, однако, Исламская революция в Иране существенно трансформировала американские подходы и возможности. Безусловной региональной державой является Израиль, развивающийся во враждебном окружении. Саудовская Аравия, Египет, Катар, Сирия и др. представляют более слабые государства, обладающие ограниченными возможностями по влиянию на регион. В Турецкой Республике с приходом к власти в 2002 году умеренных исламских политических сил в лице Партии справедливости и развития (АКР), трансформируются внешнеполитические подходы в сторону реанимации османских технологий. Р.Т. Эрдоган ставит своей целью, чтобы Турция в среднесрочной перспективе достигла статуса лидера исламского суннитского мира. На основе общих или схожих взглядов лидеры правящей в Турции партии Справедливости и развития стали устанавливать связи и тесное сотрудничество с умеренной исламской арабской силой ассоциацией «Братья мусульмане». С 2011 года данный регион захлестнула «арабская весна», в результате которой к власти стали приходить умеренные арабские исламские политические силы (ассоциация «Братьев мусульман»), которые потеснили авторитарные консервативные режимы. Для Запада как цивилизации умеренный исламский проект, носителями которого являются правящая турецкая партия Справедливости и развития и общеарабская ассоциация «Братья мусульмане», представляет системную угрозу, сопоставимую с большевистским проектом сто лет назад. Проект имеет детально разработанную модель государственного, экономического, финансового и юридического развития общества, радикально отличную от западных принципов. Разделение Ислама на шиитскую и суннитскую части в регионе часто лежит в основе противостояния различных государств и сил. В Сирии данное разделение также присутствует: алавитское меньшинство (15% шиитского населения)

является элитой в суннитском государстве. Естественным геополитическим и культурным (в рамках противостояния шиитов и суннитов) союзником Сирии является Иран. В конфликте в Сирии столкнулись нерегиональные акторы: разделенный Запад (США, ЕС), Россия и Китай, региональные – Турция, Саудовская Аравия, Катар, Иран, Израиль. Практически выбыл из игры Египет. Внутространовые военно-политические силы – салафиты⁶ (корень – салаф, то есть исламские фундаменталисты), боевое крыло «Братьев мусульман» (умеренные исламисты) и курды. Еще до начала существующего конфликта, взаимоотношения Сирии и Турции были осложнены территориальной проблемой, а также проблемой распределения водных ресурсов рек Тигра и Евфрата. Первая проблема была инициирована европейскими странами передачей в июле 1939 года Францией Турции Александреттского санджака, считавшегося сирийской территорией, в настоящем – одного из крупнейших нефтяных портов Средиземноморья (порт Искендерун). Вторая – вызвана экономической программой Турецкой Республики, связанной со строительством комплекса плотин («проект Ататюрка») на двух основных реках региона. Таким образом, Турция в состоянии регулировать естественный ток воды в направлении Сирии и Ирака.

Такой инструмент воздействия на соседние государства оказывается весьма эффективным фактором политического и экономического давления. В современном конфликте внешнеполитическая линия Анкары в отношении Дамаска изначально была подчинена логике всесторонней поддержки сил ассоциации «Братья мусульмане» (главной оппозиционной режиму Башару Аль Асада силы) без непосредственного вступления в войну, по крайней мере, в ее

⁶ Салафизм – джихадизм – идеология, которая сформировалась в Афганистане в середине 1980-х гг., в ходе деятельности миссионеров в лагерях моджахедов. По сути «Аль-Каида» сейчас дискредитировала антиасадовское движение. При этом необходимо учитывать, что эта часть «Аль-Каиды» имеет иракское происхождение, то есть уровень антиамериканизма в ней имеет чрезвычайно высокий уровень. Главными союзниками США в регионе являются нефтедобывающие монархии и салафитские государства (Саудовская Аравия, Арабские Эмираты, Бахрейн и Оман).

острой фазе, а также других протурецких сил. Однако вскоре Турции пришлось непосредственно проводить ряд военных операций на территории САР.

Вторым по значимости региональным субъектом в сирийском вопросе является Израиль. Его позиция, как ни странно, заключается скорее в заинтересованности сохранения режима Башара Аль Асада, что связано со значительной протяженностью общей сухопутной границы и предсказуемостью нынешнего политического режима Башара Аль Асада для Тель-Авива. Кроме того, политическая сила «Братья мусульмане» напрямую связана с Организацией Освобождения Палестины – «Хамас»; последняя, по сути, является ее дочерней организацией. Поэтому, в случае реализации самого благожелательного для Турции сценария, то есть прихода к власти в Сирии представителей «Братьев мусульман», вся Сирия превращается для Тель-Авива в «Сектор Газа № 2». Но, несмотря на заинтересованность Израиля в сохранении политического режима Аль Асада, он предпринимает попытки для того, чтобы на общем фоне уничтожить как можно большую часть военной инфраструктуры Дамаска. Очевидно для того, чтобы выйти на возможные будущие переговоры с более выгодными позициями. Одной из главных причин низкой эффективности военных успехов сирийской оппозиции, является ее раздробленность и разобщенность.

«Сирийский котел» продолжает кипеть, заставляя великие державы трансформировать свои подходы к кризису. На глобальном уровне за последние несколько лет сформировались определенные технологии конфликтного управления миром. Сирия стала звеном в цепи данных механизмов. Так, несмотря на глобальный кризис капиталистической экономики, США как ведущая держава мира, продолжают активный глобальный внешнеполитический курс, который требует значительных капиталовложений. Хотя именно США находятся в «ядре» финансового коллапса, внешняя политика Вашингтона продолжает сохранять свою военно-силовую составляющую, которая достаточно дорого обходится американскому бюджету и налогоплательщикам. Однако такая активная силовая политика США, несмотря на растущий внешний долг и системные проблемы в

экономике, имеет свой практический, в том числе, финансовый смысл. Так именно такая внешнеполитическая линия США имеет следующие последствия в долларовоцентричной мировой экономике.

Во-первых, военные кризисы в мире проходят по двум сценариям: на периферии экономических центров (страны группы БРИКС), которые одновременно являются и геополитическими соперниками Вашингтона (Северная Корея, китайско-японские отношения, Кавказ, Сирия, российско-грузинские противоречия и т.д.). Капитал при этом уходит из этих регионов в «тихую гавань» мировой экономики, то есть в США и доллар. Второй сценарий представляет следующую производную: в условиях глобализации экономики и финансового сектора, Вашингтону не обязательно предпринимать силовые акции на периферии своих геоэкономических и геополитических конкурентов. Практически тот же эффект достигается, если потенциальная точка напряжения в военно-политической сфере возникает в любой точке мира. Если напряжение возникает в различных регионах поочередно и на системной основе обеспечивается постоянный приток экономических инвестиций в проблемную американскую экономику, то таким образом поддерживается американская экономическая система, которая служит основой для военно-технологического и силового лидерства.

Во-вторых, за исключением Китая, который нуждается в ресурсах для своей «мировой мастерской», в современной глобальной экономической системе другие силовые центры попадают в исключительную ситуацию, когда их экономические интересы входят в противоречие с геополитическими. Так, от силовых акций США на Ближнем Востоке до начала мировой пандемии 2020 года выигрывал российский бюджет и в целом существующая экономическая система РФ – правда речь идет о краткосрочных интересах. Возникает ситуация соблазна поддержки любых акций сверхдержавы, которые будут приносить краткосрочные экономические выгоды, даже если они противоречат геополитическим интересам. По крайней мере, такой соблазн будет возникать у части государственной и бизнес элиты, интересы которой связаны с сырьевым и финансовым сектором

мировой экономики. Современная ситуация вокруг Сирии – явный пример таких противоречий. Война – это действенный способ списания долгов. Но если масштаб долгов беспрецедентный и носит глобальный характер, то и конфликт должен быть глобальным. Иначе эффект их «сгорания» будет недостаточным для финансового сектора мировой экономики.

Задание 3.1. Прочтение вступительной статьи к Разделу 3 направлено на формирование углубленного представления о ситуации в регионе. Одно из ключевых понятий статьи – balance of power («баланс сил»). Уточните значение этого термина.

Выполните перевод фрагмента статьи.

Задание 3.1.1.

ASSAD REGIME GAINS IN ALEPPO ALTER BALANCE OF POWER IN NORTHERN SYRIA

Battlefield realities rather than great power politics will determine the ultimate terms of a settlement to end the Syrian Civil War. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his allies in Russia and Iran have internalized this basic principle even as Washington and other Western capitals pinned their hopes upon UN-sponsored Geneva Talks.

Задание 3.1.2.

Roundtable: Shifting the balance of power in north-east Syria

On 9 October 2019, two days after President Donald Trump announced the withdrawal of US troops from the Syrian-Turkish border zone, Turkey launched Operation Peace Spring in north-east Syria. These developments led to a rapid and dramatic change in the military situation east of the Euphrates River, in a region which contains 80% of the country's oil and gas resources.

This resulted in: the withdrawal from the Turkish border region of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the backbone of which consisted of Kurdish fighters; the establishment of a new zone of Turkish influence in Syrian territory; and the return of Syrian regime forces east of the Euphrates. This also allowed Russia to increase its

presence east of the Euphrates, playing the role of guarantor and mediator between Turkey, the regime and the SDF.

What are the objectives and strategies of the three main external actors (Turkey, Russia and the US)? What will the results be of the Russian-sponsored negotiations between the Kurdish Autonomous Administration and the Syrian regime? To what extent will the Syrian regime return east of the Euphrates and what will be the fates of the SDF and the Autonomous Administration? What are the possible scenarios of re-integrating the economy of north-eastern Syria with the rest of the country?

Задание 3.1.3.

Syria: A Changing Balance of Power

22 SEP 2016

By Dr Anthony Billingsley

The Syrian catastrophe staggers on from outrage to outrage reaching, as the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon recently observed, a “new level of depravity” with the attack on a UN aid convoy in northern Syria. Refugee flows continue with significant repercussions beyond the region. And, of course, the killing goes on.

For a while, it looked like the United States and Russia had accepted the unacceptability of the situation and were working cooperatively to break the habit of violence that has engulfed the various groups fighting in the country. The ceasefire that the two countries were working on was always going to be fragile with many groups determined to prevent its success. However, until the US attack on Syrian troops and now the aid convoy attack, Moscow and Washington appeared determined to make the arrangement hold. The prospects for continued cooperation have been seriously set back but, despite the mutual recriminations, it is to be hoped that the negotiations will continue.

The challenges are, however, awesome and made more complex by the changing regional dynamics following the Iran nuclear deal but, more immediately, by the emergence of Russia as the dominant power in the region. In the early days of the Syrian war, the US might have been able to push through an end to the fighting on its own terms.

Задание 3.2. Прочитайте статью из журнала Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ). Определите ядро статьи – понятие, вокруг которого она выстроена.

Материал был опубликован в 2017 году. Насколько он актуален? Как соотносится точка зрения автора (издания) с официальной позицией России по поводу сирийского конфликта. Дайте краткий письменный анализ на русском языке (1500 – 1800 символов с пробелами).

Выполните письменный перевод статьи.

SHIFTING BALANCES OF POWER IN THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

Friday, June 16, 2017 |

Serdar Ş. Güner, Dilan E. Koç

Syria is the perfect example of a failed state occupying territory, subjected to the controversial ambitions of foreign powers. It has been transformed into a theater of shifting alliance positions among numerous actors including the US, Russia, and Turkey. The trajectories of pipelines transporting natural gas reserves from the Persian Gulf to world markets are at the heart of US-Russian interactions in Syria.[1] The eventual formation of a Kurdish state covering northern Syria and Iraq is the prize as the pipelines traverse the new state's territory. An independent Kurdish state also means the insertion of a new actor in the map of the Middle East, together with its prospects of being involved in territorial conflict with neighboring Turkey and perhaps with Iran as well. The enlargement of the Middle Eastern system with a new state creates fundamental changes in alliance possibilities and balances of power. Combined with energy and territorial issues, these possibilities would affect not only the region but the whole international system.

Furthermore, the Syrian conflict evolves at such a pace that ally-enemy distinctions become blurred almost daily. While they are NATO allies, the US and Turkey disagree on the issue of helping Syrian Kurds militarily so that they can be of use in fighting against the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Russia and Turkey are now cooperating in contrast to the hostility experienced following the Turkish downing of a Russian fighter jet.[2] And while the US and Russia oppose each other on the issue of

world energy distribution, they harbor aligned interests with respect to helping and cooperating with Syrian Kurds, a move which alienates Turkey. These volatile conflict positions can confuse the most astute observers of the region.

Shifting Balances in Friendship and Hostility

We need an analytical perspective to make sense of the swift and complex shifting of conflict-cooperation directions in the Syrian conflict. Age-old precepts of balances of power among states are helpful in this task. The precepts are not foreign to policy makers. They help us not only analyze alliance dynamics, but also conduct thought experiments about who would align with or against whom. They are formulated as follows: “A friend of my friend, as well as an enemy of my enemy is my friend,” and, “a friend of my enemy, as well as an enemy of my friend, is my enemy.” These principles constitute the axioms of structural balance theory.[3] The theory implies that balanced international systems can occur either when all states are mutual friends, or, when they are divided into two antagonistic alliances such that alliance members are friends.[4] Thus, in general, in a triangular (or trilateral) relationship, a balance occurs either if all three states are mutual friends or any two states become friendly with each other, but hostile against the third. Take, for example, the US’ assistance to Syrian Kurds. The top priority of Turkey in Syria is to prevent the formation of a Kurdish state. If the US reveals its preference for Syrian Kurds to form their independent state, Turkey might befriend Russia. If Russia opposes US plans of creating a Kurdish state in Syria, or is perceived by Turkey to do so, then Russia and Turkey become mutual friends according to the principle of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Today, the situation is rather different: Both the US and Russia oppose Turkey by siding with Syrian Kurds. Both countries helping Syrian Kurds weakens the US-Turkey alliance relationship and erodes recent Russo-Turkish rapprochement as well.

This perspective allows us to do two things. First we are able to understand and analyze actual hostility-friendship relations among actors involved in the Syrian conflict, and, second, we can explore unobserved developments in the process of alliance formation and dissolution. This is important, because the Syrian conflict takes so many sharp turns that the above mentioned developments previously qualified as

hypothetical actually occur, such as the US-Russia move to help Syrian Kurds. Therefore, our analysis does not permit us to ignore the possible changes in hostility and friendship directions, which policy makers might evaluate as imaginary and speculative.

The Emergence and Atrophy of Russo-Turkish Rapprochement

Initially, Turkish disillusionment with US activities aimed at helping Syrian Kurds facilitated Russo-Turkish cooperation over natural gas transportation. Turkey and Russia have started to cooperate especially concerning the issue of energy and the natural gas pipeline called the Turkish Stream, which connects both countries.[5] Only a dramatic event interrupted the rapprochement between Russia and Turkey. This was the Turkish decision to down a Russian warplane along the Syrian-Turkish border. Russia later accepted Turkish apologies and the presidents of both countries resumed relations. Russia and Turkey then started to cooperate, for example, they agreed on the evacuation of Aleppo. Hence, Turkey and Russia became good friends. It is not surprising that the assassination of the Russian ambassador to Ankara in 2016 did not weaken ties. Rather, on the contrary, it reinforced good relations.[6]

While Russia and Turkey cooperated on targeting ISIS positions, US participation in these operations remained limited. These developments meant that the initial US-Turkey alliance on the Syrian regime and the Qatar pipeline targeting Russia morphed into a Russia-Turkey alliance on ISIS and the Turkish pipeline, in spite of the fact that Turkey is a NATO member and an ally of the US. As Russia opposed the US and Turkey resumed cooperation with Russia, Turkey faced an alignment problem. This is because if Russia and the US are both friends of Turkey, they should not be involved in mutual conflict as, “a friend of mine cannot be an enemy of my other friend.” In such a context, a balance occurs only if an overall cooperation among the three states is established.

The other balanced situation is that two states coalesce against the third. Thus, if Turkey cooperates with Russia, Russia must compete with US designs for an independent Kurdish state in Syria. If both pursue such an objective, then this would mean that Turkey is confronted with two global competitors/cooperators. Turkey merely becomes a thorny problem in a confluence of great power stakes. In fact, Vladimir

Putin's recent reassurance to Turkey about Moscow's military cooperation and Donald Trump's silence about US collaboration with Syrian Kurds during his meeting with the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, reveal that a two-against-one configuration exists in this context.[7] The US and Russia have aligned interests, opposing those of Turkey. These are the early signs of the deterioration of Russo-Turkish rapprochement.

The Impact of the Russo-Turkish Rapprochement on the Russia-Syria Alliance

The precepts of balance of power imply that one cannot have friends in conflict with each other. We understand these implications by taking a close look at the rapprochement between Russia and Turkey. We note that the rapprochement was problematic in the first place. The reason for this can be framed as a question: How could Russia cooperate with Turkey, a country which publicly revealed its preferences for the end of the Syrian regime? If Turkey and Syria are in conflict, then Russian cooperation with Turkey would mean that "the enemy of my friend is my friend." Ankara and Damascus must then establish friendly relations to be consistent with the balancing precepts. Hence, Russians must solve the problem of their support for the Assad regime while Turkey, a new friend, is aiming for its removal. The Russian mission is, therefore, to reduce mistrust and uncertainty to the extent that Russia-Turkey rapprochement does not damage the Russia-Syria axis. One then has to ask, to what extent would an alignment of Russian and Syrian interests toward the Kurds alienate Turkey today? As for Syria, it would perceive the rapprochement as a Russian deception in the following form: "My best ally now cooperates with my sworn enemy," or, "how can Russia, our staunch ally, be cooperating with Turkey?" Syria would wonder how long the Russia-Turkey rapprochement can endure or how deep it will be, and ask why their foremost ally has now reduced its level of conflict with Turkey. Syrian suspicions would in turn feed a Russian urge to explain to Syria why Russia suddenly shifted from conflict to cooperation when dealing with Turkey or at least to try and ease Syrian suspicions and concerns. As for Turkey, it would now ask, "how can we secure our objective of ousting the Assad regime with the support of my new friend, Russia?" The Turkish foreign policy problem then becomes one of whether the Turkish objective of toppling the Assad regime will be realized under the rapprochement. And if

Russia helps Syrian Kurds, then one could assert that the Turkish problem is mitigated as Turkey would perceive that Russia is no longer a stable friend.

A new phase in a Turkey-Syria friendship while Bashar Al-Assad remains in power would provide relief for all three states. If Turkey no longer pursues its objective of ousting the Assad regime, then bilateral relations among Russia, Turkey, and Syria can transform into mutual friendships under one condition: Turkey coexists with an unchanged Syrian regime that prevents Kurds from creating a separate enclave. Such a *modus vivendi* can be achieved through Russian mediation and diplomacy to mollify the attitudes, beliefs, and positions of Turkey and Syria with respect to each other. Syria and Turkey can then work out a solution similar to the Camp David Agreement of 1973 between Egypt and Israel with the help of Russia.[8] A necessary condition might be that Turkey prioritizes the prevention of a Kurdish state in Northern Syria rather than the removal of Assad, and that the Syrian priority is Assad's leadership. Therefore, Russia, Turkey, and Syria can cooperate and become friends, yet the actual course of events indicating US-Russia collusion about Kurds eliminates such an optimistic development.

Balances and Imbalances among the US, Russia, Turkey, and Syria

The principles imply that the US-Turkey friendship can be pitted against a Russia-Syria alliance, or, if Russia, Turkey, and Syria become friends, the US becomes their common target. The first configuration is discarded under the rapprochement between Russia and Turkey and the US' preference to arm Kurds in Syria. The second one, a Russia-Turkey-Syria alliance targeting the US, generates a "three-against-one" configuration. The second configuration can evolve into the first one under the condition of US-Turkey cooperation which would require the end of the Russia-Turkey rapprochement. Such an evolution would again put Turkey under strain, as its two friends, the US and Russia, are in conflict.

The US' assistance to Syrian Kurds prevents a full US-Turkey friendship anyway. So, we can also propose that the precepts allow for yet another balance configuration, namely a coalition of the US, Russia, and Syria against Turkey. Whom can Turkey rely on then? Two answers can be given to the question: Turkey can rely on itself through

internal balancing efforts to increase and improve its military might, or, through external balancing efforts by aligning with another state that has very high stakes in Syria.

Iran's Debut

Let us imagine that Turkey and Iran discuss the Syrian issue from the perspective of the creation of a Kurdish state. If we include Iran in the picture, then we must deal with the mutual hostility and friendship relations of five states. While there exist ten triangular relations among the US, Russia, Turkey, Syria, and Iran, two types of configurations offer consistency with the balancing precepts: Either all states become mutual friends, or they are divided into two competing alliances such that states in the same alliance are friends but enemies of all states in the other.

Overall cooperation between the US, Russia, Turkey, Syria, and Iran is very desirable but not attainable in the current conflict. No perfect alignment of interests is possible among these states. Thus, there can be three-against-two and four-against-one configurations consistent with the precepts. Of the five possible four-against-one configurations, the one that pits Russia, Turkey, Syria, and Iran against the US is obviously more likely than, for instance, the alliance of the US, Russia, Iran, and Turkey opposing Syria. The cooperation of the four states with each other and their antagonism toward the US generates consistent friend-enemy relations. However, the US-Russia collaboration with respect to the Kurds in Syria under an eventual green light given by the Syrian regime would reveal that a US-Russia-Syria friendship isolates Turkey. Iran, in this case might join Turkey or its two friends: Russia and Syria. The latter option is more likely. Thus, the isolation of Turkey can be strengthened further by Iran.

An alternative configuration can form if Iranian geopolitical interests toward the Kurds align with those of the US. Now suppose that the US and Iran have concordant interests toward the establishment of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq and Syria. It follows that Russia, Turkey, and Syria should oppose them under the condition that Russia, Turkey, and Syria all agree upon Syrian territorial integrity. Such a bipolarization necessitates a split of the friendship relations among Russia, Syria, and

Iran. Therefore, there would be strong incentives for antagonism over the Kurdish issue upsetting the Russia-Iran and Syria-Iran cooperation. Hence, the Iranian interest in the formation of a Kurdish state should be so deep that Iran would forego its incentives to remain a Russian ally and a supporter of the regime in Damascus. Such a change is impossible. Iran would rather choose Russia and Syria creating a problem for Russia. Russia collaborating with the US would then have to solve its foreign-policy problem of the US and Iran, now both Russian friends, who are in conflict with each other.

Concluding Remarks

One can still add Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq, and any other actor into the analysis and arrive at clear-cut results. The overall result is that the precepts of the structural balance generate clear directions of enmity and friendship relations over Syria. The analysis mostly produces a black and white picture of friendship and enemy relations in the conflict. Yet, it provides significant guidance by delineating the maze of international politics in all its shades of gray. We learn that balancing precepts magnifies the details of the impact the ongoing interactions have over the course of the conflict.

We see that if Russia and the US become friends by agreeing on a working solution regarding the Kurds and pipeline trajectories, Iran, Syria, and Turkey could become alienated. The US-Russia alignment of interests over the creation of a Kurdish state is, however, fragile. Russia can permit a Kurdish state formation in Syria only under the condition that the newly formed state becomes a Russian ally à la Syria, a development the US would reject since the whole Syrian territory again remains under Russian influence. In the case of US-Russia competition or cooperation to attract the Syrian Kurds, the latter would then choose either the US or Russia as friends, adding complexity to the opposition of interests in the region. If a Kurdish state is born, it cannot have both the US and Russia as friends if these two oppose each other on the energy issue. Consequently, if the US and Russia agree or disagree over the allegiance of the Syrian Kurds, wars will devastate Syria for many years to come. Therefore, a competition or an agreement between the US and Russia over Kurdish independence in

Syria implies a protracted conflict in the Middle East. Indeed, the current US-Russia collision over the strategic Syrian town of Manbij may turn into an endless struggle.[9]

Continuous instability in the Middle East endangers world peace. Policy makers of involved actors in the Syrian conflict should reconsider their decisions of alignment and de-alignment to prevent further conflagration in the region. The more complex alignment politics becomes, the less chances there are to reach a workable peace.

Currently, the political map of the Middle East has become such a roller coaster ride that it is critical to make analyses within a well-defined framework. The available evidence on the Syrian conflict becomes meaningful when viewed within the framework of simple balance of power principles, showing that imbalances which imply inconsistent friendships are more harmful than a stable bipolarization of the conflict. Thus, policy makers on each side of the conflict that are busy evaluating the possible courses of enmity might neglect how friendly bonds perceived as the least likely are indeed possible. The Middle East constitutes an important global theater, and policy makers must be careful of myopic friend/enemy dynamics in the region, which could only lead to worldwide instability.

Finally, the inner dynamics and relations of states make a world of difference. More than two millennia ago, Sun Tzu remarked in his work *The Art of War*:

There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. There are not more than five primary colors, yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen. There are not more than five cardinal tastes, yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted. [10]

Sun Tzu's quote illustrates how friendship and hostility relations among the few that shape not only the stability of the Middle East, but also that of the global system.

[1] F. William Engdahl, "Russia Trumps USA Energy War in Mideast," *New Eastern Outlook*, 17 September 2016; Mitchell A. Orenstein and George Romer, "Putin's Gas Attack: Is Russia Just in Syria for the Pipelines?" *Foreign Affairs*, 14 October 2015; Christina Lin, "Saudi Arabia and Turkey's pipeline wars in Yemen and Syria," *Asia Times*, 12 June 2016, http://www.atimes.com/saudi-arabia-and-turkeys-pipeline-wars-in-yemen-and-syria/#_ftn8; Rob Taylor, "Pipeline Politics in Syria," *Armed Forces Journal*, 21 March 2014. Qatar and Iran are the possessors of the field by the ratios of two-third and one-third, respectively.

- [2] “Turkey’s downing of Russian warplane – what we know,” *BBC News*, 1 December 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34912581>
- [3] Fritz Heider, “Attitudes and Cognitive Organization,” *Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 21, No. 21 (1946), pp. 107-112.
- [4] Donald Cartwright and Frank Harary, “Structural Balance: A Generalization of Heider’s theory,” *Psychological Review*, Vol. 63 (1956), pp. 277-293; Tibor Antal, Pavel L. Krapivsky, Sidney Redner, “Social Balance on Networks: The Dynamics of Friendship and Enmity,” *Physica D*, No. 224 (2006), pp. 130-136; Frank Harary, “A Structural Analysis of the Situation in the Middle East in 1956,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1961), pp.167-178.
- [5] John Galt, “Why the CIA, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar are Furious about Erdoğan’s Russian Rapprochement,” *International Reporter*, 15 August 2016, <https://theinternationalreporter.org/2016/08/15/why-the-cia-saudi-arabia-and-qatar-are-furious-about-erdogans-russian-rapprochement/>
- [6] “Russian ambassador to Turkey shot dead by police officer in Ankara gallery,” *The Guardian*, 20 December 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/19/russian-ambassador-to-turkey-wounded-in-ankara-shooting-attack>
- [7] Josh Lederman and Vivian Salama, “Erdogan to Visit Trump Amid Rising Tensions Between the U.S. and Turkey,” *Time*, 15 May 2017, <http://time.com/4778783/trump-erdogan-visit-turkey-us/>; Roland Oliphant, “Russia ‘to train US-allied Kurds in Syria,’” *The Telegraph*, 21 March 2017, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/21/russia-train-us-allied-kurds-syria/>
- [8] The Camp David agreements signed on 17 September 1978 were worked out once it is found that the Egyptian priority is sovereignty over the Sinai Peninsula and that the Israeli priority was security and recognition by an Arab state. The solution was a demilitarized Sinai as an Egyptian territory satisfying both sides. According to the agreement, Egypt retrieved the Sinai with the withdrawal of Israel from the peninsula and Israel reached its aim by getting a recognition from an Arab State. The accords were a sign of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel, and a big step for the purpose of peace and stability in the Middle East. See, Howard Raiffa, *The Art and Science of Negotiation: How to Resolve Conflicts and Get the Best out of Bargaining*, (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 205-217.
- [9] “Kurds pledge to fight Turkey to retain Syria’s Manbij,” *Al Jazeera*, 18 February 2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/02/kurds-pledge-fight-turkey-retain-syria-manbij-170218134339051.html>; Henry Meyer and Taylan Bilgic, “Russia, Turkey, U.S. Hold Military Talks Amid Syria Standoff,” *Bloomberg*, 7 March 2017, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-07/russia-turkey-u-s-hold-military-talks-amid-syria-standoff>
- [10] Sacred Texts, http://www.sacred-texts.com/tao/aow/aow13.htm#fn_281

Задание 3.3. Прочитайте статью из журнала The Atlantic, опубликованную в 2015 году. Найдите явную фактическую ошибку. Как должен поступить переводчик в таком случае: предложите варианты решения проблемы.

Выполните письменный перевод статьи на русский язык.

The Link Between Putin's Military Campaigns in Syria and Ukraine

Both countries host Russian naval bases. What role do ports play in Moscow's foreign policy?

Edward Delman

October 2, 2015

In the past year and a half, Russia has intervened militarily in two countries, Ukraine and Syria, where revolution and extreme political polarization threatened the governments of pro-Russian leaders. And that's pretty much where the similarities between the campaigns end, except for one other commonality: Both Syria and Ukraine are home to Russian naval bases—in Tartus and Sevastopol, respectively.

Ports, and especially warm-water ports, have long played an important role in Russian foreign policy. Russia isn't landlocked, of course, but Europe-facing ports such as Arkhangelsk and St. Petersburg were historically ice-locked for part of the year before the advent of the icebreaker in the 20th century (Russia's port at Murmansk is ice-free, but it was built in 1915, and the Russian port at Vladivostok is on the Pacific). Moreover, none of these ports, even when open for business, allow for easy access to the bustling Mediterranean Sea. This has left Russia with an economic and military incentive to expand toward warmer waters. Beginning just before the reign of Peter the Great in the late 17th century, Russia fought a series of wars with the Ottoman Empire in a quest to establish a warm-water port off the Black Sea. By 1812, Russia had managed to secure control of the entire northern coast of the Black Sea.

Even with year-round ports on the Black Sea, access to the Mediterranean was still governed by the whims of whoever controlled the Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits. During World War I, Russia made a never-consummated secret agreement with Britain and France that would have granted it control of Constantinople and the Turkish straits if the Allies proved victorious. Although Russia enjoyed access to naval bases throughout the Mediterranean during the Soviet era, the collapse of the U.S.S.R. brought an end to that access, with the exception of Russia's base in Tartus, Syria.

Tartus lies on Syria's western coast and has had a Russian naval presence since 1971. At the time, the Soviet Union was Syria's primary arms supplier and used the

deepwater port as a destination for shipments of Soviet weapons. Russia managed to maintain access to Tartus after the fall of the U.S.S.R. due in part to a deal that wrote off Syrian debts to the Soviet Union. The Russian naval base itself is reportedly less than impressive—it lacks large-scale repair facilities and a command-and-control capability, which would allow Russia to oversee operations from Tartus—but it is able to accommodate all Russian naval vessels except for the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier, and offers a means of offloading arms and personnel.

The city and naval base of Sevastopol, on the Crimean peninsula, were founded in 1783 by the Russian Empire, and the city remained part of Russia until its transfer to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1978. Six years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia renounced territorial claims to the city in exchange for a 20-year lease of the warm-water naval base. It's a military asset with substantial strategic and symbolic value. The base houses Russia's Black Sea Fleet and Mediterranean Task Force, the latter of which was only reestablished in 2013, and helps Russia project power in the Black Sea region and into the Mediterranean. The port was also the site of two major wartime sieges. As of last year, 15,000 Russian naval personnel were stationed at the base; in 2008, it served as a staging ground for blockades and amphibious landings during Russia's war with Georgia.

Jeffrey Mankoff, a Russia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told me that while Russia's invasion of Crimea in the spring of 2014, following the revolution that ousted pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich, may have occurred regardless, "the presence of the base [at Sevastopol] made doing something there more urgent." He also noted that Russia chose to go as far as annexing Crimea, thereby ensuring control over Sevastopol, whereas it did not take the same approach in Abkhazia or South Ossetia—two breakaway Georgian republics allied with Russia but not endowed with Russian naval bases.

The base in Tartus may be less valuable than its counterpart in Sevastopol, but the location of the former matters. As the sole Russian naval base beyond the Bosphorus—which is controlled by Turkey, a NATO member—Tartus helps establish Russia's presence in the Mediterranean. "A big part of their continued interest in Syria and in

[Syrian President Bashar] Assad has to do with” the Tartus base, Mankoff said. “I think Russia does have a bigger geopolitical view of the world, regards the eastern Mediterranean as an area of importance, and wants to be sure that it can secure its interests there.” According to General Philip Breedlove, NATO’s top commander, Tartus may also be part of a Russian effort to establish an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) bubble over Syria, designed to prevent NATO forces from taking offensive action against Russia and its allies in the region. As Vice Admiral Viktor Chirkov, the commander in chief of the Russian Navy, succinctly put it, “This base is essential to us.”

Both Sevastopol and Tartus play a role in compensating for Russia’s geographic deficiencies as well. “Russia’s always had the challenge of not having great maritime access, just as a result of its geography, and so to the extent that it wants to be an active player in [the Mediterranean] ... it has to have some ability to operate outside of its own coastal waters,” Mankoff explained. This ambition is enshrined in Russia’s new maritime strategy, detailed in the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2020. The strategy places particular emphasis on the Atlantic Ocean due to “NATO expansion, the need to integrate Crimea and the Sevastopol naval base into the Russian economy, and to re-establish a permanent Russian Navy presence in the Mediterranean,” according to Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin. The doctrine also stresses the importance of the Arctic, given its mineral resources and the easy access it offers to both the Atlantic and Pacific.

All this isn’t to suggest that naval strategy is the primary motivation behind Russia’s interventions to support pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine and Assad in Syria. In the case of Syria, Putin has a track record of opposing Islamist movements like ISIS (in fact, that track record is one of the factors that brought him to power in the first place). Mankoff suggested that Russia’s Syria policy could be a mix of the personal and the political, saying, “If Putin believes that Assad is his guy and that he has a personal obligation to him, then that may play a role above and beyond what the professional diplomats and strategic thinkers believe is going on here.” Additionally, Mankoff argued that the Russian government might be deliberately trying to draw a comparison

between its unflinching support of Assad and America's brittle support of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, which dissipated during the Arab Spring.

But even if Russia isn't exclusively mobilizing its military to secure naval bases, the Kremlin has clearly demonstrated that restoring a strong presence on the high seas is a priority. And Vladimir Putin tends to act on his priorities.

Задание 3.4. Прочитайте статью. Найдите в ней средства создания образности. Выполните письменный перевод статьи на русский язык.

Is Putin Turning the Mediterranean Into a Russian Lake?

He can try.

February 20, 2020

by Michael Peck

Key point: The Mediterranean has long been a strategic area for military and commercial maritime traffic. Although NATO has a presence there, so too does Russia—and Moscow is ramping it up. Is the Mediterranean the new playground for the Russian Navy?

Russia is expanding its naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean because it's easier than trying to, compete with the United States on the world's oceans, according to Dmitry Gorenburg, an expert on the Russian military, in an analysis for the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies.

"Maintaining naval presence in the Mediterranean is a far more effective strategy for the Russian Navy than pursuing a globally active blue-water navy because Russia has neither the resources nor the global ambitions to challenge U.S. naval supremacy around the world," writes Gorenburg. "Moscow's focus on developing and augmenting the Mediterranean squadron is thus a far more achievable limited objective that is well aligned with Russia's foreign policy objectives in the region."

During the Cold War, Soviet warships were a familiar sight in the Mediterranean. The Fifth Eskadra, the Soviet Mediterranean squadron established in 1967, would tail U.S. aircraft carriers, ready to strike them with missiles, torpedoes and even nuclear

weapons in the event of war. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the squadron was disbanded in 1992.

It was resurrected in 2013 as the Mediterranean Squadron, drawn primarily from the ships of the Black Sea Fleet, which itself has been equipped with several new submarines and surface ships. Meanwhile, the Syrian port of Tartus – a Cold War pit stop for the Fifth Eskadra – has again become a Russian base for servicing warships, including nuclear-powered vessels.

“Since the addition of six *Varshavyanka*-class submarines to the BSF in 2017, Russia has stationed two such vessels in Tartus, Syria,” Gorenburg writes. “Surface ships and submarines from Russia’s other fleets, mainly the Northern and Baltic, have participated in squadron operations at various times as well. The force has actively contributed to Russia’s

military operations in Syria. In addition to delivering troops, BSF [Black Sea Fleet] vessels have fired Kalibr missiles at ground targets throughout Syria. Russian ships have also shadowed U.S. ships in the eastern Mediterranean, and Russian submarines deployed to the Mediterranean have tracked U.S. and NATO platforms there as well. The squadron has also facilitated Russian naval diplomacy efforts, as ships from the squadron have called at ports at Cyprus, Egypt, and Malta.”

In addition, Russian aircraft operate from Syrian bases, as well as a variety of missile systems, including S-400 and S-300 long-range and Pantsir short-range anti-aircraft missiles, as well as K-300 Bastion and Kh-35 coastal defense anti-ship missiles. A permanent force in the Mediterranean enhances Russian prestige in the region, deters Western military operations in the areas, and provides security against the Mediterranean as a base for hostile forces to strike the Russian homeland.

Gorenburg sees Moscow as eschewing an American-style power projection navy with its big aircraft carriers, in favor of a more defensive forces armed with access denial weapons such as small missile-equipped corvettes. “The idea is that the Russian Navy can use these ships to create maritime zones that are difficult for enemy forces to penetrate. These ‘A2/AD bubbles’ in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean form a set of layered defenses and multiple vectors of attack through the combination of long-

range sea-, air-, and ground-launched missiles used to deny access, with shorter-range coastal and air defense systems focused on area denial.”

The old Soviet-era cruisers and destroyers will continue to make port visits for prestige, but the small ships and the missiles will form the essence of the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. Gorenburg expects the Mediterranean Squadron will comprise 10 to 15 surface warships and a couple of submarines.

However, Russia faces severe challenges in maintaining a meaningful naval presence in the Mediterranean, Gorenburg points out. Russia’s economy is sputtering, the country’s shipyards have been plagued by delays, and supplying its Mediterranean forces through the Bosphorus chokepoint in wartime could be a problem.

“Because of these challenges, Russian leadership would, prior to any outbreak in the eastern Mediterranean, have to choose whether to fight in the Mediterranean or attempt to bring forces back to the Black Sea to defend Russia’s southern borders. Should Russian forces stay in the Mediterranean, they would pose a serious threat to U.S. and NATO forces by creating an increasingly dense missile and electronic-warfare environment farther into the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Russia would have to expect that it would lose these forces to an ultimately numerically and qualitatively superior enemy force, albeit after exacting a potentially high cost on its adversary.”

Задание 3.5. Прочитайте статью. Найдите в ней средства создания образности. Выполните письменный перевод статьи на русский язык.

Why Is Russia in Syria?

JAKUB GRYGIEL *Published on: January 2, 2020 in The American Interest*

To be a European great power, Russia needs to be a player in the Mediterranean—and it is gradually but steadily becoming one.

Russia recently announced that it will spend \$500 million to x and update the commercial port of Tartus in Syria. In 2017 Moscow had renewed its lease over the port, signing an agreement with Damascus in a clear show of support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. But Russian (and before 1991, Soviet) naval presence there dates back to the early 1970s. A remnant of a much vaster Soviet string of bases

developed from the 1970s on, Tartus is now the only port Russia has outside of those on its own shores. What to make of this renewed Russian effort to have a Mediterranean presence? Given Russia's economic weakness—and long land borders—why is Moscow so focused on Syria and in particular on having a naval footprint there?

There are three related answers to these questions.

First, Russia needs outlets to break free of its *de facto* landlocked position. Since Peter the Great, Moscow has pushed to have a presence in the more distant seas, from the North Sea to the Mediterranean, in order to be able to compete with the other great powers. Russia has access to seas, of course, but the Baltic and Black seas (not to mention the Caspian Sea, an endorheic basin with no drainage into any other body of water) are effectively closed and offer at best the possibility of local dominance and control. The push to have access to “warm-water ports” is a constant in Russian foreign policy, characterized by “matchless simplicity of conception and persistence of effort,” as Robert Strausz-Hupé put in a 1947 essay.

The fact that Moscow has a decrepit navy with its sole aircraft carrier on re in a dock should not diminish the strategic impact of a Russian port in the Eastern Mediterranean. In a way, compared to Western seapowers, Russia's maritime power develops in reverse: Moscow needs to have outlets to the open seas before it can develop a commercial fleet and powerful navy. Most European naval powers developed navies to protect an already developed shipping route, and their coastlines and ports. Russia needs ports before it can have a navy. Tartus is one such small but strategically important port.

Second, the Mediterranean is a peculiar sea that favors those who control the shores more than large fleets. Moscow's investment in Tartus does not mean, in fact, that Russia will have a large fleet in the Mediterranean. But the Mediterranean is not the open Atlantic or Pacific where the size of the navies matter. Great power confrontations in the Mediterranean are often confrontations over ports rather than ships.

Horatio Nelson noted in 1798, with some puzzlement, that the “Russians seem to me to be more bent on taking ports in the Mediterranean than destroying Bonaparte in Egypt.” The British admiral was annoyed at the Russian unwillingness to challenge the

French fleet, while British military analysts a century later thought that the Muscovite penchant for ports rather than large fleets meant that Russia was not a threat.

But the Mediterranean is a sea for land powers: What matters is control over the coastline and especially the straits. Today's Russian rapprochement with Turkey may be fragile and temporary, but it has mitigated the risk for Moscow that the Black Sea will be a closed body of water. And the fortification of the Russian military presence on the Syrian shores means that a large portion of the Eastern Mediterranean will be under Russian overwatch, if not control.

Third, Russia is interested in the Mediterranean as a strategic prize that will allow Moscow to be a much more influential player in Europe. The Mediterranean sea appears to be a backwater that is of interest only to tourists and students of ancient history. But in reality it continues to play a similar role as in past centuries: Whoever controls the Mediterranean has enormous leverage over Europe.

Historically, the Mediterranean sea had two important features. First, it was a highway of commerce not just between Europe and the Middle East and Asia, but also among European countries. As railways and highways were built in continental Europe, the sea lost some of its importance, and with it, Great Britain, the master of this sea since the late 18th century, lost some of its leverage over France and Germany. But the Mediterranean continues to be a valuable waterway with 15 percent of global shipping activity (10 percent by ship deadweight tons, according to 2013 data). It is also a growing source of energy as large gas deposits are being discovered (with accompanying tensions among states, such as Greece and Turkey that have competing claims).

The second important feature of the Mediterranean was that it was a security frontier for Europe. Ancient Rome discovered quickly that its security could not be found in southern Italy or even Sicily, but had to be established on the North African shores leading to two Punic wars (three, if one counts the total destruction of Carthage). The situation has not changed. Europe is not secure if the Mediterranean sea is a highway of threats sailing northward. The instability of the Middle East and North

Africa of the past decade has demonstrated that European security is not on the European coastline of the Mediterranean but on its southern shores.

Russia's presence in the Mediterranean, however limited, adds another driver of instability to the region, complicating further the geostrategic calculus of an already weakened and contentious Europe. The Russian naval presence in Tartus, therefore, is a means for Moscow to exert leverage over Europe. It can promise to help to stabilize the Mediterranean while at the same time threatening to create even greater volatility. In other words, Russia can present itself as both the problem and the solution, in either case elevating its influence over European powers.

There is, therefore, a serious strategic rationale for Russia's involvement in Syria and, more specifically, for the recent announcement of a sizeable financial investment in the port of Tartus. It is not just the whim of Putin as an unpredictable autocrat seeking personal glory or stubbornly protecting Assad, a fellow Middle Eastern dictator. Moscow has grander goals that are not new and are rooted in a clear understanding of the nature and the value of the

Mediterranean. To be a European great power, Russia needs to be a player in the Mediterranean—and it is gradually but steadily becoming one.

РАЗДЕЛ 4.

RUSSIA IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: HOT NEWS



Новостная журналистика, казалось бы, представляет гораздо меньше пространства для манипуляций мнением читателя, чем прочие публицистические жанры: за счет преобладания факта, цифры, имени – всего того, что мы относим к объективной информации. Но на деле и новостная заметка призвана оказывать влияние на

реципиента.

Считается, что требования оперативности и лаконичности не позволяют журналисту глубоко анализировать событие, пристально его изучать, выяснять все детали и нюансы, всесторонне оценивать, по крайней мере на этапе подготовки первого сообщения. Заметка сообщает только самое главное о событии. Итак, функция заметки – оперативное сообщение основной информации о событии. Чтобы успешно ее реализовать, достаточно полно и объективно выяснить главное, получить точные ответы на классические вопросы: кто и что сделал? где и когда это случилось? как и почему произошло? Поэтому масштаб охвата действительности в заметке ограничен пространственными и временными рамками рассматриваемого события.

Информационная база заметки чаще всего не является достаточной для глубоких выводов и широких обобщений. Этого не требует и информационная природа данного жанра, ведь заметка сообщает о факте, но не анализирует его.

Вместе с тем в ряде случаев жанр заметки позволяет автору выразить свое отношение к событию, дать его общую оценку, чаще всего чувственно-эмоциональную.

Задание 4.1. Прочитайте текст. Определите его жанр, аргументируйте свою точку зрения. Несет ли текст авторскую оценку? Почему?

Выполните письменный перевод текста.

Задание 4.1.1.

2 Russian warships pass through Bosphorus amid high tensions

BY FRENCH PRESS AGENCY - AFP

FEB 28, 2020 11:27 AM GMT+3

Two Russian warships armed with cruise missiles transitted the Bosphorus strait in Istanbul on Friday on their way to Mediterranean waters, as tensions spiraled between Turkey and Russia following the deaths of at least 33 Turkish soldiers in Syria, the Russian military said.

The two Russian frigates – the Admiral Makarov and the Admiral Grigorovich – had earlier left the port of Sevastopol on the peninsula of Crimea, which Russia annexed from Ukraine in 2014, and were transitting the Bosphorus and then the Dardanelles straits, a Russian military spokesman said.

"The frigates Admiral Makarov and Admiral Grigorovich – armed with highly accurate Kalibr-NK missile systems – are carrying out a planned transit from Sevastopol," fleet spokesman Aleksei Rulev told the RIA Novosti and Interfax news agencies.

He did not specify where the ships were eventually heading, but Russian naval ships that pass through the Bosphorus normally head into the Mediterranean to back Moscow's operations in Syria.

The transit came hours after Ankara announced at least 33 Turkish soldiers were killed in Syria's Idlib province after a strike it blamed on Russia's ally Damascus.

Russia said the troops were "where they should not have been" and had been among "terrorists."

The incident has raised new questions about the sustainability of the alliance between Turkey and Russia to bring peace to Syria.

As a Black Sea littoral state, Russia is allowed to have its military ships pass through the Bosphorus under the 1936 Montreux Convention on the Straits.

Under its terms, Turkey can only block Russian naval shipping if war is declared or if it feels under an imminent threat of war.

The intense traffic of Russian vessels to and from Syria – known as the Syrian Express – has caused immense curiosity in Istanbul, where the warships pass through the heart of the city in full view of ship-spotters.

Задание 4.1.2.

Russian Navy blocks off part of eastern Mediterranean for new missile tests

BEIRUT, LEBANON (1:30 P.M.) 17.04.20– The eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea has been mostly blocked off by Russian warships that are carrying out naval drills until April 11th, Avia.Pro reported on Thursday.

“The central section of the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea was unceremoniously blocked by Russian warships, which intend to carry out full-fledged missile launches, thereby practicing at striking the enemy,” Avia.Pro reported.

“According to a number of sources, the central portion of the eastern Mediterranean is closed between March 31 to April 1, and also from April 9 to 11.

The Russian military has been conducting several drills off the coast of Syria for a number of days now, but it appears there are still more to come.

“Experts note that formally the Russian fleet does not close the passage for foreign ships in this region, however, announcing missile launches in advance, removes all existing risks, while the likelihood that foreign warships appear in the region during this period is very small,” they said.

“The fact that Russia confidently operates in the waters of the Mediterranean Sea, which a few years ago could not even be thought of, indicates the fact that Russia really has high power in this region and is ready to demonstrate it,” an expert told the publication.

The Russian Navy has a large presence in the eastern Mediterranean, which is due in large part to their naval base in the Tartous Governorate of western Syria.

Задание 4.1.3.

Naval base in Syria anchors Russia to Mediterranean

Yuras Karmanau, The Associated Press

September 26, 2019

TARTUS, Syria — A Russian submarine has moored at Russia's base in Syria after a patrol mission while another one is getting ready to sail off after replenishing supplies — the rotation that underlines Moscow's growing military foothold in the Mediterranean region.

The naval base in Tartus is the only such facility Russia has outside the former Soviet Union. In 2017, Moscow struck a deal with Syrian President Bashar Assad to extend its lease on Tartus for 49 years.

The agreement allows Russia to keep up to 11 warships there, including nuclear-powered ones.

Russia has waged a military campaign in Syria since September 2015, allowing Assad's government to reclaim control over most of the country following a devastating civil war.

An air base in the nearby province of Latakia has been the main hub for the Russian military campaign, while the commercial ports in Latakia and Tartus have served as top supply hubs, handling ships with fuel and military equipment in a massive supply effort dubbed the "Syrian Express."

As part of its efforts to restore the Soviet-era practice of keeping warships on a permanent vigil in the Mediterranean, Russia has moved to modernize and expand the naval facility in Tartus.

"Russia has come here for a long time," said Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov.

Reporters on a trip to Syria organized by the Russian Defense Ministry could see a missile corvette sailing off on patrol and a group of navy divers practicing at the Tartus harbor.

Capt. Sergei Tronev, the chief of the Russian navy command in the area, said in addition to two submarines moored at the harbor, Tartus now also hosts two missile corvettes, three patrol boats and three supply vessels.

Tronev added that along with the ships in Tartus, the navy's force in the eastern Mediterranean currently includes the guided-missile cruiser Marshal Ustinov, which has sailed from its Arctic base of Severomorsk, and the guided-missile frigate Admiral Makarov detached from the Black Sea Fleet.

The Soviet Union maintained a constant navy vigil in the Mediterranean during the Cold War but Russia's presence in the region withered in the years after the 1991 Soviet collapse amid economic woes and military funding shortages.

As part of Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to beef up the Russian military amid tensions with the West, the Russian navy in recent years has revived the Soviet-era practice of constantly rotating its warships in the Mediterranean.

Next month, the Russian navy plans to open a maintenance shop in Tartus that will further bolster the base's capability.

"It will make it easier to repair ships and maintain its naval capability in the region," said Yevgeny Gushchin, a navy officer in charge of the shop. "We now have to deliver all spares and repair tools by plane, which slows things down. After the shop's opening we will be able to manufacture them here."

Задание 4.1.4.

Assad regime, Russia start oil, gas exploration in Mediterranean

BY DAILY SABAH

DEC 26, 2019 11:37 AM

The Bashar Assad regime said Wednesday it has started joint hydrocarbon exploration works with Russia in the Mediterranean.

"This is the first time I am talking about this: Syria has begun the work on oil and gas exploration in the Mediterranean with Russian companies," Assad's adviser Bouthaina Shaaban said.

The announcement comes amid heightened tension in the Eastern Mediterranean over Turkey's maritime deal with Libya. The deal enables Turkey to secure its rights in the Mediterranean while preventing any fait accompli maneuvers by other regional states. The agreement asserts Turkey's rights in the Eastern Mediterranean in the face of unilateral drilling attempts by the Greek Cypriot administration, clarifying that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) also has rights to resources in the area. Fellow regional actor, Greece, did not welcome the deal and even regarded it as a violation of its own rights, though international law deems otherwise.

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